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In 2007, just before the domestic economy experienced a major 
trauma, the Cultural Policy Center at the Harris School and NORC at the 
University of Chicago launched a national study of cultural building in 
the United States. It was motivated by multiple requests from leading 
consultants in the cultural sector who found themselves involved in 
a steadily growing number of major building projects—museums, 
performing arts centers (PACs), and theaters—and from foundation 
officers who were frequently asked to help fund these infrastructure 
projects. With the generous support of the Andrew W. Mellon 
Foundation, the Kresge Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine  
T. MacArthur Foundation, we were able to conduct systematic scientific 
research on cultural building in the United States between  
1994 and 2008 and come to a number of conclusions that have 
important implications for the cultural sector.
SUMMARY Of  f INDINgS
Our research resulted in a number of conclusions on cultural building in 
the United States, particularly in regard to the inquiries we conducted 
on 1) the landscape of cultural building, 2) the investment determinants 
of cultural building, 3) the feasibility of cultural building projects, 4) case 
studies of cultural building projects, and 5) the effects on communities 
in which cultural projects are built. These conclusions are summarized 
below and explored in detail in the report.
ExEcUTIvE  SUMMARY
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The Landscape of cultural Building
•	 There	was	a	substantial	increase	in	cultural	facilities		
 building, particularly between 1998 and 2001 (i.e., the  
 “building boom”). 
•	 Building	in	the	arts	grew	faster	than	or	on	par	 
 with building in other sectors, particularly health  
 and education.
•	 The	Southern	region	saw	a	huge	increase	in	the	total		
 number of cultural facilities during the period studied— 
 significantly greater than other parts of the country.
•	 Smaller	cities	with	fewer	than	500,000	people	were		
 building as well, and many of these cities were building  
 for the first time.
•	 PACs	were	the	dominant	form	of	new	facilities.
The Investment Determinants of cultural Building
•	 The	more	existing	cultural	facilities	a	city	has,	the	 
 more it must invest in renovating and replacing those  
 facilities.
•	 Rising	population	and	higher	average	levels	of		
 education and income help explain why some cities  
 built more than others.
•	 The	supply	of	cultural	facilities	may	have	exceeded	 
 the demand for them, particularly in the building 
 boom period.
The feasibility of cultural Building Projects
•	 Based	on	our	observations	of	projects,	we	identified		
 important characteristics that led to more or 
 less successful projects within the following four 
 dimensions: 
 
	 •	 The	project’s	motivation	was	comprised	of	both	the	organization’s		
  sense of its artistic mission and by organizational need.
  
	 •	 Project	leadership	that	was	clear,	consistent,	and	sustained	 
  throughout the planning and building process improved the  
  chance of positive outcomes.
  
	 •	 Efficient	project	timelines	and	how	effective	project	leadership	 
  was in responding to feedback helped determine a project’s  
  success in implementation.
  
	 •	 Project	outcomes	were	influenced	by	how	flexible	and	realistic	the		
  organization was in projecting revenue for the post-completion period,  
  and how effective the project leaders were at controlling expenses.
case Studies
The case studies will be of value in determining how best 
to manage building projects in the cultural sector going 
forward. Planning and designing a building strategically 
involves balancing a number of elements: the way 
that a new facility fits into and enhances the ability to 
deliver on mission; the organization’s actual capacity 
(additional staff, technical support, marketing expertise) 
to operate effectively in an enhanced and expanded 
space; engaging the surrounding community in ways 
that enhance the longer term health of the organization 
and its infrastructure; and identifying and strengthening 
funding streams for the near- and longer term. Finding 
an equilibrium among these managerial challenges 
maximizes the project’s viability and sustainability.
The Effects on communities
•	 There	is	no	clear	pattern	of	spillover	effects	(negative	
 or positive) of specific cultural building projects on  
 non-building local cultural organizations and the  
 greater community. 
•	 Few	organizations	viewed	themselves	as	competitors		
 of the organization that was building or expanding its  
 facility.
•	 There	was	only	limited	evidence	that	cultural	building		
 has significant effects on the overall changes in the  
 number of arts organizations, their employment,  
 or payrolls. 
This report and the findings highlighted here represent 
just one of a number of different products we were able 
to develop as a result of this study. Others include several 
working papers, case studies, and datasets; two major 
books under contract with the University of Chicago 
Press; plans to create an executive education program on 
cultural building; and other more impactful vehicles that 
will help disseminate our findings to the cultural sector. 
With this report, we hope to not only communicate 
what we have learned, but also what we hope to learn 
in the future now that we have inaugurated a broad and 
detailed dialogue on the practice of building for cultural 
organizations. 
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INTRODUcTION
In 2007, just before the domestic economy experienced a major 
trauma, the Cultural Policy Center at the Harris School and NORC at the 
University of Chicago launched a national study of cultural building in 
the United States. The study was motivated by multiple requests from 
leading consultants in the cultural sector who found themselves involved 
in a steadily growing number of major building projects—museums, 
performing arts centers (PACs), and theaters—and from foundation 
officers who were frequently asked to help fund these infrastructure 
projects. They had a sense that something was awry, in particular that 
the level of investment in bricks and mortar as a percentage of total 
revenue and assets was disproportionate, and that because of this, it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to forecast what the fallout would be on 
the institutions behind these building projects, on the communities in 
which they were built, and on the sector as a whole.
or the public and those comprising the audiences 
for this wave of new cultural facilities, the growth 
seemed like a tangible indication of prosperity in 
the arts sector. expansive venues, signature architectural 
statements, bustling new centers of artistic activity, and 
objects of civic pride—all of these could appear to be 
positive indicators. And, at least in the beginning, each of 
these projects was based on the assumption that a new 
facility would help increase audience size, increase earned 
and donated income, and at least indirectly help realize 
the institution’s mission. 
On the other hand, for those who had a sense that 
the heavy emphasis on bricks and mortar was causing 
problems, many building projects seemed extremely 
costly and perhaps too large to be sustainable in the long 
term. These projects substantially weakened the host 
organizations financially, and in many cases appeared not 
to be demonstrably more effective vehicles for delivering 
on mission. They involved immense capital expenditures, 
and when completed, left buildings with large annual 
operating expenses that were sometimes beyond the 
capacity of the organizations that built them. These 
observations were, however, anecdotal and therefore 
perhaps not representative of the universe of new cultural 
buildings. There was nowhere to go for systematic 
supporting data and analysis of the building boom as a 
whole, and there were no comprehensive studies, even 
though billions of dollars were being spent on projects 
that taxpayers were often helping to fund, both directly 
and indirectly. Because journalists were frequently 
covering the most dramatic (and often catastrophic) 
of these cases, there was a general awareness of the 
phenomenon, but no notion of how widespread it was, 
how similar the cases were (or were not), and what the 
resulting impact of these ambitious building ventures—
both on arts organizations and on the urban and regional 
arts communities they inhabited—was turning out to be. 
With the generous support of three major foundations, 
we assembled a research team and began our work. 
The universe of cultural building projects we studied 
consists of museums, PACs, and theaters, ranging 
from $4 million to at least $335 million. It includes new 
facilities, expansions, and renovations; iconic and grand 
civic identity projects designed by internationally known 
architects and embraced by civic leaders, as well as 
community-generated arts facilities; and buildings funded 
through complex public/private funding arrangements, 
as well as more generic structures built entirely with 
donated money. The buildings include both single-use 
structures, as well as hybrid facilities that combine 
the functions of galleries, performing arts venues, and 
community centers. Some are single organization venues, 
and others serve a variety of arts organizations.
F
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In order to frame the research project in the most useful 
and effective manner possible, we started by convening 
a planning meeting in the fall of 2006. The meeting 
included organization leaders, trustees, consultants, 
individual philanthropists, and foundation officers who 
work within the cultural sector. Here we learned how new 
facilities were creating an imbalance in the allocation 
of resources between capital investment and the funds 
used for operations, and how organizations trying to 
meet a new set of needs and expenses risked exhausting 
their donor pools. In some instances, projects appeared 
to push institutions even further from their missions in 
order to keep up with the new and increased financial 
demands. They also alerted us to board decision-making 
patterns,	the	influence	of	“star”	architects,	relations	with	
the public sector, and the dynamics between donors, 
governing boards, and paid staff—with all of these being 
identified as key elements that can help push a project 
off the rails. Attendees questioned whether sufficient due 
diligence was being taken in advance of most decisions 
to build, and pointed to the difficulty of stopping a 
project already underway. And they suggested that the 
cultural sector increasingly seems to believe that if a 
superb new facility is built, this will be sufficient to create 
a new and enthusiastic audience—and thereby create 
sufficient demand to justify the large capital expenditure. 
Careful financial risk assessment and a healthy level of 
caution and skepticism were, in their experience, too 
often trumped by high levels of optimistic enthusiasm.
This persuaded us that it was likely true that large 
building projects present risks even to healthy arts 
organizations with long traditions of support and 
involvement of donors and audiences, let alone for brand 
new or abruptly expanded smaller institutions.  
A better understanding of how large-scale cultural 
building impacts the overall sustainability of local arts 
ecologies, based on hard data and detailed analysis, 
would assist in strengthening the American cultural 
sector over the longer term. 
Our report opens with a broad demographic and 
economic overview of what was happening in the United 
States before and during the span of this study—1994 
to 2008. Using a broad pool of data, we trace the 
development of certain demographic and economic 
patterns	that	may	have	influenced	the	abrupt	expansion	
in cultural building projects. Some very clear patterns 
emerge which suggest why building occurred in certain 
regions of the country more than others, and in general, 
why so much building took place.
Chapter Two gives a detailed view of the landscape of 
cultural building projects across the country. This part 
of the study makes it possible to move beyond hearsay 
about how much building actually took place, where it 
happened, and at what expense. In addition to getting 
an accurate sense of regional variations (which are 
significant), we are better able to understand both the 
rate of change in spending on cultural facilities, and why 
this expansion took place.
In Chapter Three, we identify the investment 
determinants of cultural building on the basis of the 
criteria an organization could have used to decide 
whether to launch a large infrastructure project. In 
order to do so, we looked at broad economic data, at 
demand in the cultural sector (notoriously difficult in 
terms of getting an accurate picture), and at detailed 
urban demographic profiles in the cities where building 
took place. For example, we looked at the relationship 
of the number of artists in a city to the rate of per 
capita investment a city made in cultural infrastructure. 
We also looked at the effects of population change, 
education, and median household income on per capita 
investment. A significant portion of what we found was 
counter-intuitive. It is in this chapter that we explore our 
hypothesis that in many cases investment in facilities may 
not have been in response to actual demand from the 
sector (i.e., other factors were at work). In this manner, 
we lay the groundwork for a better understanding of the 
complex issue of supply and demand in the arts. But we 
are also very aware that there is still much work to do—
both from a data collection standpoint, and in terms of 
analytic tools. This, in turn, points to the general goal in 
the field of developing a better comprehension of what 
constitutes a healthy cultural sector, and what proxies 
can be deployed for this.
Chapter Four contains the findings from our analysis 
of the feasibility of planning and building processes 
that take place during these infrastructure projects. 
The ultimate purpose here was to conduct an analysis 
that would assist practitioners and building project 
managers—one that could help them develop and 
improve upon effective practices in planning, building, 
and managing capital facilities. We developed a 
theoretical apparatus that easily enabled us to illustrate 
the important characteristics we observed in the projects 
we studied. The discussion revolves around why projects 
are understood, appropriated, mobilized, and deployed in 
some instances, and not in others.
Our underlying goal in this chapter is to describe 
precisely how the projects we studied unfolded on a 
purely observational level. Hence, the analysis is positive 
in nature in that we focus on what we observed rather 
than on how we believe projects should have unfolded. 
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We discuss our observations in regard to the underlying 
motivation, the character of leadership of an organization, 
the degree to which the project was conceived and 
launched efficiently, how the project leaders responded 
to internal and external criticism and feedback, how price 
controls were maintained, and how effective revenue-
generating strategies were for the post-project period 
when adequate income becomes critical to the longer 
term success of a new facility.  
Chapter Five looks at the detailed case studies we 
produced, which will be available as teaching tools 
for MBA, executive education, and arts administration 
programs. They will also be valuable resources for 
trustees, executive directors, major donors, foundation 
officers, and others who want to embark on major 
building projects in the arts. These vividly written case 
studies paint a rich portrait of the kinds of problems 
and tensions that appear from the very beginning of 
these large-scale building projects, and are designed to 
give practical lessons to those in the field about how to 
neutralize problems to help ensure a successful outcome.
Finally, Chapter Six explores the effects of large 
infrastructure projects on the surrounding community 
and particularly other cultural organizations. This part 
of the study looks at the relationship between each 
city’s broader building context and at the perceptions 
of a large sample of non-building community cultural 
organizations regarding the effects of a major local 
cultural building project on their own organizations, and 
on the broader cultural community. It also discusses how 
competition might be defined in this sector and whether 
there are any differences between organizations that 
consider themselves direct competitors. We also look 
briefly	at	the	economic	impacts	these	projects	may,	or	
may not, generate.
In conclusion, we outline what we have learned from 
each part of the study of cultural building over the 
past few decades, and more importantly, what the 
most crucial avenues are for future research, of which 
there are many. To say that we learned a lot, and also 
contributed to what used to be (and still is) a small body 
of evidence-based research on cultural building in the 
United States, would be an understatement. This report 
and the findings highlighted here represent just one of a 
number of products we were able to develop as a result 
of this study. Others include several working papers, 
case studies, and datasets; two major books under 
contract with the University of Chicago Press; and other 
more impactful vehicles that will help disseminate our 
findings to the cultural sector. With this report, we hope 
to not only communicate what we have learned, but also 
what we hope to learn in the future now that we have 
inaugurated a broad and detailed dialogue on the practice 
of building for cultural organizations.  
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cHAPTER  ONE 
DEMOgRAPHIc AND EcONOMIc cONTExT fOR THE STUDY
short demographic tour of the United States 
from 1970 to 2000 provides a useful backdrop 
for understanding the context for our study of 
cultural building. We focus attention on the 1990s when 
most of the projects we studied were being dreamt 
about, and were then ultimately brought into being. This 
decade differed from those that preceded it and from 
the one that followed. It was a decade of economic 
exuberance only widely seen as irrational after the 
successive downturns of the 2000s. Plans made during 
this decade produced a cultural building boom that 
primarily came to fruition in the late 1990s and the early 
2000s.  
Decisions to invest in new buildings are made in the 
immediate context of local needs and aspirations. 
According to our research, these decisions come after 
a lengthy planning period, typically at least five to ten 
years, during which time larger national and regional 
trends	also	exert	some	influence.	Because	people	tend	
to extrapolate trends, what is important is not only 
what is going on during the planning period, but also 
how it contrasts with the recent past. Combined, these 
influences	define	the	climate	in	which	people	make	long-
term investment decisions.
We are going to sketch the larger demographic and 
economic picture that formed the climate in which the 
myriad visionaries, planners, and project managers were 
operating—in which they thought about, and then built 
new cultural facilities. We begin with demographics 
because changes in the size and character of the 
population not only have direct effects on demand for 
many goods and services; they also have indirect effects 
through changes in tastes and lifestyles.
The decade from 1990 to 2000 in which the thinking 
and planning for the great boom in cultural building 
took place was a very interesting moment in recent U.S. 
history. To take the simplest fact first, total population in 
the United States grew at a rate of slightly over 1 percent 
per year from 1970 to 2000. This growth, however, was 
not evenly distributed over the decades or evenly across 
regions of the country. From 1990 to 2000, population 
growth was 1.2 percent per year; a rate over 30 percent 
higher than in the previous and subsequent decades. 
But from a geographic perspective, the country was not 
growing at all uniformly. The South and the West were 
the fastest growing regions throughout the 30-year 
period, growing more than five times faster than the 
Midwest and eight times faster than the Northeast. The 
decade from 1990 to 2000, however, showed an unusual 
pattern for the Midwest. While the rate of population 
growth, compared with that of the previous decades, was 
about the same for most regions, the rate of growth in 
the Midwest during this period was six times faster than 
in the previous decade. Thus, those in the Midwest  
were experiencing a relatively faster rate of growth than 
they were accustomed to, while those in other regions 
were not.
The effect of population growth in determining the 
demand for culture, as we know from a number of 
reliable studies, partly depends on the educational 
level of the population that is expanding. Overall, the 
educational level of the U.S. population, as measured by 
the proportion of the population aged 25 or over who are 
college graduates, grew from about 20 percent in 1990 
to about 25 percent in 2000. Since those with higher 
education are more likely to attend concerts and go to 
museums or theaters, an increase in the educational level 
of the population would be expected to put pressure on 
cultural institutions to expand in order to accommodate 
increased demand. But, as with population growth, the 
educational level growth rates were not the same across 
all regions of the country, nor were the starting points 
the same. The Northeast and the West had substantially 
better-educated populations in 1990 than did the 
Midwest and the South, but the South was now attracting 
disproportionally better-educated people.
f IgURE  1 .  
Change in Population Growth Rate by Region from 1980-1990 to 1990-2000.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division.
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So the picture is this: throughout the 30-year period, 
the South and the West were growing in population at 
a considerably higher rate than the rest of the country—
with the exception that the Midwest grew at a relatively 
faster rate than it was accustomed to in the decade of 
the 1990s. But not only was the South growing at a fast 
pace, the growth was taking place disproportionately 
among those with more education. 
On the economic front, the growth in gross domestic 
product (GDP) was fairly constant in the country as a 
whole, clocking in at a little more than 3.5 percent per 
year from 1970 to 2000, before declining sharply in the 
following decade. Those who were responding to the 
perceived needs and opportunities for cultural building 
lived in a climate of steady, strong economic growth, one 
that could reasonably be projected into the future. 
It did seem reasonable to expect that undertaking 
substantial long-term financial commitments would be 
relatively low risk, given the overall economic climate. 
Macroeconomists were referring to the lack of cyclical 
downturns as “the great moderation,” and many believed 
that the decline in economic volatility was permanent. 
What they did not foresee, of course, was that economic 
growth in the 2000s, when most of the buildings would 
come on line, would essentially fall off a cliff. During this 
decade, GDP growth was about one-half the rate of the 
previous three decades. 
Behind this overall constant rate of GDP growth in 
the country as a whole prior to 2000 is an interesting 
regional story. The South not only saw the largest 
increase in population, it also had the largest increase 
in per capita GDP. Thus, the large population growth in 
the	South—along	with	an	influx	of	more	highly	educated	
people and a higher per capita GDP growth than the 
rest of the country—suggests that demand for cultural 
activities was growing faster in the South than elsewhere 
in the country. The Northeast had very high growth in 
the 1980s, but lower than other regions in the 1970s and 
1990s. The West showed the lowest increase in per capita 
GDP from 1970 to 2000.
While GDP may be a good indicator of the overall health 
of the economy, it is not clear what impact simple 
changes in GDP have on demand for cultural amenities, 
and particularly for fundraising. We do not have good 
data for tracking the changes in wealth in this period 
for different regions of the country. But a great deal of 
U.S. wealth is held in the stock market, and there was an 
extraordinary run up in the U.S. stock market during this 
period. The S&P 500 index more than quadrupled in the 
1990s, creating huge increases in philanthropic capacity 
among wealthy Americans. Real estate is another large 
component of wealth, but the boom in residential real 
estate occurred later than the stock market, starting in 
the late 1990s and nearly doubling by the peak in 2006. 
Were cultural facilities actually available to meet the 
demand? Data on cultural facilities themselves are even 
less good than that for economic and demographic 
factors. Changes in the way data are categorized make 
it difficult to make comparisons across time and region, 
but we do have reasonably reliable data on the number 
of cultural facilities for 1990. In the United States as a 
whole, there were about seven cultural facilities (defined 
as theaters, musical and entertainment venues, and 
museums) per 100,000 people. Not surprisingly, however, 
given the differences in population, education, and 
income, there were substantial differences among the 
various regions. The Northeast and the West had the 
largest number of cultural facilities, the Midwest and the 
South the least. To give you an idea of the scale of these 
differences, in 1990 at the beginning of the decade, there 
were about twice as many cultural facilities per capita 
in the Northeast and the West than there were in the 
Midwest and the South. This pattern holds for theaters 
and performing arts venues, but less so for museums, 
although it is important to note that the South still has 
the lowest number of museums per capita of any region. 
f IgURE  2 .  
Growth in Percent of Population with at Least a Bachelor’s  
Degree by Region: 1990-2000.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division.
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We have tried to paint a picture of the major economic 
and demographic trends that were the backdrop to the 
cultural building drama that unfolded in the 1990s, and, 
to some extent, is working itself out even today. On a 
national level, strong and consistent economic growth, 
a booming stock market, and an increasingly educated 
population all combined to make arts building projects 
appear attractive and viable. Underneath the national 
trends, we see a more complex regional picture—the 
South firing on all cylinders with a booming population 
that was becoming more educated and strong per capita 
economic growth. The West saw large population gains 
but slower per capita growth. The Northeast and Midwest 
had much lower population growth, and many of their 
cities struggled as the U.S. economy shifted away from 
manufacturing.
cHAP TER  TwO 
THE LANDScAPE Of cULTURAL BUILDINg 
 
he study of cultural building was partly based 
on the premise that there was a spike in cultural 
facilities building—a “building boom”—in the 
United States sometime in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Therefore, one of the primary objectives of the study 
was to describe, in detail, what the landscape of cultural 
building looked like during this period and whether in 
fact there was actually a building boom. Specifically, our 
objective was to determine how much building occurred 
during this period, where cultural facilities were located, 
and what types of buildings were built.1 Using data on all 
cultural construction projects started between 1994 and 
2008, we looked at the total cost of cultural construction 
projects, the geographic distribution of projects, and the 
specific types of projects.
 
TOTAL  cOST  Of  cU LTU RAL 
cONSTRU c TI ON P ROjEc TS
The total cost of cultural construction projects launched 
between 1994 and 2008 was approximately $16 billion. 
According to building permits, the average cost of an 
individual project was about $21 million and the median 
cost was approximately $11 million. The fact that there 
was a greater average cost than median cost suggests 
that there were a substantial number of projects started 
during this period that cost far more than $11 million. In 
fact, 25 percent of projects cost more than $21 million, 
and project costs ranged from a lower bound of $4 
million to an upper limit of $335 million according to the 
building permit data. While we did not include projects 
valued under $4 million, there were actually very few 
projects that fell below this threshold (121 to be exact), 
and out of these projects, only one cost less than $3 
million. 
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f IgURE  3 .  
Number of Cultural Facilities Per 100,000 People in 1990.
Source: U.S. Census Breau, County Business Patterns.
T
TABLE  A .  
Distribution of Cost of Projects (2005 USD).
Source: McGraw-Hill Construction, Inc.
N TOTAL MEAN M EDI AN M I N M Ax
725 $ 1 5 , 52 6 ,876 ,1 98 $2 1 ,4 1 6 , 38 1 $ 1 1 , 306 ,973 $3 1 ,10 1 , 202 $4 ,000,000 $335 ,142 ,666
1 See Appendix I for a description of the study’s methodology. More specific information regarding the analysis are expanded upon in  
“An Overview of Cultural Building in the United States: 1994-2008,” (Woronkowicz, 2011) available on the study’s website. 
STANDARD
DEvI AT I ON
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It is important, however, to remember that the costs 
listed on the building permit data we used were most 
likely starting construction costs and therefore did not 
include the costs of furnishing these facilities. Nor did 
the building permit costs include the cost of equipping 
the facilities with the latest technologies, which for 
many cultural organizations was the primary reason to 
build. Furthermore, since the costs were starting costs, 
they	did	not	reflect	the	price	escalation	that	most	likely	
took place before these projects arrived at their final 
cost. Based on a representative sample of 56 projects 
we studied in more detail, we were able to estimate 
the average difference between the cost that was 
listed on the building permit and the actual final cost. 
From interviews with the directors of these projects' 
organizations and by obtaining information on the final 
cost of their projects, we estimated that the actual cost 
of museums was on average 69 percent greater than the 
value that was listed on the building permit, PACs were 
on average 82 percent greater, and theaters were on 
average 19 percent greater. Thus, the total cost of cultural 
building was far greater than what the permit data tell us.
Building, however, was not evenly distributed across the 
15 years we studied. As initially hypothesized, we saw 
a period in which total building costs escalated quite 
dramatically. In other words, there was a building boom 
that occurred in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. From 
1998 to 2001, the total cost of building increased from a 
little over $400 million to almost $1.8 billion. The total 
cost of all building projects was the highest in the year 
2001; in this year alone, the total cost of building made 
up over 11 percent of the total cost of building across all 
15 years. 
Cities and cultural institutions across the United States 
were also spending more on physical infrastructure in 
the first decade of the 21st century than they had been in 
the last decade of the 20th century. As illustrated in the 
graph, the total cost of building was much higher in the 
2000s than it was in the mid-to-late 1990s. Relative to 
other	economic	figures	that	fluctuated	during	this	period	
(i.e., GDP, Gross Private Domestic Investment (GPDI) in 
nonresidential structures, Disposable Personal Income 
(DPI), total contributions to arts and culture), there were 
still clear trends indicating a sharp increase in the total 
cost of building cultural facilities between 1998 and 2001 
and greater investment in physical cultural infrastructure 
in the 2000s than in the 1990s. Furthermore, it was likely 
that there were more projects started rather than that 
individual projects were getting more expensive and 
hence contributing more to the total cost. The median 
cost of cultural building projects remained relatively 
stable (around $11 million) throughout this entire period.
The rate of change of spending likely had enormous 
impacts on the organizations that pursued projects and 
the cities in which these facilities were built. For example, 
if spending on physical infrastructure increased slowly 
and incrementally over time, organizational behavior 
could have had time to adjust as well. If the increases 
were dramatic, however, it would be far more difficult 
for behavior to have changed without organizations 
experiencing negative externalities, which we saw 
plenty of in our more in-depth studies of how cultural 
organizations that pursued projects were affected. 
Relative to other sectors, the rate of change of cultural 
infrastructure	spending	was	fluctuating	widely	between	
1994 and 2008. The rate of spending decreased between 
1994 and 1998, but then increased on par with both 
hospital and education spending between 1999 and 
2003—a span of time that partly encompassed the 
boom period. Spending continued to increase between 
2004 and 2008. As compared to spending on all other 
entertainment infrastructure, the rate of change of 
spending on cultural infrastructure increased far faster 
between 1999 and 2003. 
f IgURE  4 .  
Cost of Projects by Year (2005 USD).
Source: McGraw-Hill Construction, Inc.
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f IgURE  5 .  
Five-Year Average Change in Infrastructure Spending.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Capital expenditures Survey.
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SPENDINg BY  TYPE  Of  PROjEcT
Spending on cultural infrastructure also differed by 
type of institution. There was far less investment in 
traditional theater facilities than there was in museum 
and PAC facilities. In fact, theater projects only made up 
approximately 8 percent of the total cost of all projects 
whereas museums made up 38 percent and PACs made 
up 54 percent of the total cost. Figure 6 plots cultural 
infrastructure spending across the 15-year period by  
type of facility. For ease of comparison, we lump theaters 
and PACs together since investment in theater facilities 
was so minimal. In all years except one (2002), spending 
on performance facilities outweighed that on museum 
facilities. Across the 15-year period there were similar 
increases and decreases in regard to spending by 
type; however, museum spending declined more than 
performance facility spending after 2002. Spending 
by each type increased dramatically during the 
boom period. 
SPENDINg BY  gEOgRAPHY
Regions and cities also differed in how much they 
invested in cultural infrastructure. Given that there were 
stark differences in how regions’ and cities’ population 
composition and economic landscapes changed 
throughout this period, this is not surprising. First, 
population grew at a faster rate in the South than any 
other region during this period. Second, the percentage 
of educated people that comprised the Southern region’s 
population also increased at a faster rate than other 
regions. Third, DPI levels increased quickly in this region 
as well. Taken together, the Southern region became 
more dense, more educated, and wealthier faster than 
any other region in the country. Additionally, this region 
had fewer cultural facilities to start with than any other 
region. This suggests that if the South wanted to “catch 
up” to other regions in terms of the number of cultural 
facilities it already had, it would have to build more. It is 
likely then that population growth, education, and wealth 
increases had much to do with high levels of cultural 
building investment in the South. The total cost of cultural 
building was much higher in the Southern region than any 
other region in the United States between 1994 and 2008. 
It made up 32 percent of the total cost of all regions as 
compared to 25 percent in the Midwest, 20 percent in 
the Northeast, and 23 percent in the West. Relative to 
other economic changes that were going on during this 
period, the Midwestern region had the highest total cost 
of building. As a proportion of both GDP and DPI, the 
total cost of cultural building increased by the greatest 
amount in the Midwestern region. This suggests that 
cultural infrastructure spending may have outpaced other 
economic changes that occurred during this time.
There were large variations in how much (or how little) 
metropolitan statistical area (MSAs) invested in cultural 
infrastructure building. While MSAs of all sizes invested 
in cultural building during this period, the largest MSAs 
(those with greater than two million in population) built 
the most. The top three MSAs ranked in order by total 
cost of building were, surprisingly, not the three largest 
MSAs in the United States. The New York-Northern 
New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA MSA spent more 
on cultural infrastructure building during this period 
than any other MSA ($1.6 billion). Ranked second and 
third, the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA MSA 
spent approximately $950 million and the Chicago-
Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI MSA spent approximately $870 
million. The San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA MSA 
spent almost $1.2 billion but was only the 16th largest 
MSA according to data from the 2000 Census, and the 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV MSA 
spent approximately $980 million but was the 7th largest 
MSA. The top ten highest spenders comprised 52 percent 
of all spending on cultural building in the United States 
between 1994 and 2008. 
-3%
6%
4%
2%
WESTMIDWESTSOUTHNORTH
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
-2%
-4%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
10
12
8
6
4
2
0
$1,200
$1,000
$800
$400
$200
0%
29%
40%
37%
WESTMIDWESTSOUTH NORTHEAST
44%
4
SOUTH
10
WEST
10
NORTHEAST
5
MIDWEST
7
UNITED
STATES
 
 
19
9
4
19
9
5
19
9
6
19
9
7
19
9
8
19
9
9
20
0
0
20
0
1
20
0
2
20
0
3
20
0
4
20
0
7
20
0
8
20
0
6
MUSEUMS PACS and THEATERS
20
0
5
f IgURE  6 .  
Cost of Projects by Year and Type (2005 USD millions).
Source: McGraw-Hill Construction, Inc.
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f IgURE  7.  
Five-Year Average Cost of Projects by Region (2005 USD).
Source: McGraw-Hill Construction, Inc.
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Ranked in order of per capita spending, however, the list 
of top spenders looks very different. Per capita, it was 
primarily small MSAs with fewer than 500,000 people 
that invested in cultural building. The only MSA that 
ranked in the top ten in terms of both total and per capita 
spending was the San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 
MSA. At the same time, it also had the most projects 
as compared to other top per capita spenders. For 
this reason, the average cost of each project in the San 
Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA MSA was not as high as 
it would have been if there had been very few projects. 
The Pittsfield, MA MSA had the highest per capita cost 
by far. But, with its reputation as one of the country’s top 
cultural destinations, this is not surprising. 
We did not have data on how many cultural building 
projects each MSA had prior to 1994, but we were able 
to examine how many MSAs started building projects 
between 1994 and 2008. These data help illustrate 
the geographic dispersion of cultural building projects 
that took place during this period. By examining the 
geographic location of projects, we could also assess 
whether the same MSAs were building more or whether 
new MSAs were starting to build, and thus what was most 
likely to have contributed to the total cost. Assuming 
that each MSA that invested in a project in a given year  
did so for the first time, the number of MSAs that had at 
least one building project in each year gives us a sense  
of how prevalent cultural building was across the 
country. In 1994, a total of 26 MSAs started at least one 
building project. In 2001, 68 MSAs started at least 
one building project. This figure remained fairly stable—
oscillating between 54 and 66 projects—from 2001 on. 
TABLE  B . 
Top Ten Highest Cultural  
Building Spenders between 
1994 and 2008 (2005 USD).
Source: McGraw-Hill  
Construction, Inc.
TABLE  c . 
Top Ten Highest Cultural 
Building Per Capita Spenders 
between 1994 and 2008  
(2005 USD).
Source: McGraw-Hill  
Construction, Inc; U.S. Census 
Bureau, Population Division.
MSA
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-De-MD
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA
TOTA L  cOST  Of  A L L 
BUIL D IN g PROjE cTS
$1,582,283,893
$1,196,558,489
$979,420,165
$946,828,379
$868,796,758
$676,162,533
$545,099,432
$449,726,754
$436,905,861
$357,325,520
Pittsfield, MA
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA
Appleton, WI
Madison, WI
Lawrence, KS
Ann Arbor, MI
Charleston, WV
Springfield, MA
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL
134,787
2,824,987
202,508
504,044
100,295
324,491
309,37
144,661
254,418
413,171
$605.14
$423.56
$394.33
$388.54
$384.59
$275.81
$268.24
$252.19
$231.27
$221.43
6
22
2
3
2
3
2
4
3
3
$13,594,066
$54,389,024
$39,927,336
$65,279,588
$19,286,068
$29,832,674
$41,494,924
$9,120,425
$19,612,700
$30,495,844
$81,564,394
$1,196,558,489
$79,854,672
$195,838,768
$38,572,136
$89,498,020
$82,989,848
$36,481,701
$58,838,100
$91,487,535
Census 2000 
Population
Per Capita
Cost
# of  
Projects
Average
Cost 
Total CostMSA
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Comparing a map of all MSAs that had at least one 
building project in 1994 and 2008 helps illustrate the 
geographic dispersion of projects that occurred. Large 
concentrations of projects located on the coasts, but 
there were projects emerging in areas of the country—
such as the Great Plains and the Southern region—where 
we would not expect to fi nd them. In the end, it seems 
clear that many of the small MSAs in these areas engaged 
in cultural infrastructure building during this period. 
Between the years 2000 and 2002, 87 percent of large 
MSAs with greater than two million in population started 
at least one cultural building project, and 31 percent 
of small MSAs with fewer than 500,000 in population 
started at least one cultural building project. 
The ownership structure of these projects varied 
substantially. All were nonprofi t institutions, but some 
were completely private, others had collaborative private/
public organizational structures, while still others were 
completely public and owned and operated in full by 
either the city or the state. Many of these projects were 
housed in universities or colleges. Approximately 55 
percent of the total cost of all projects was comprised 
of private institutions where the indicated owner was its 
own tax-exempt organization. Twenty-four percent of the 
total cost of all projects was comprised of government-
owned institutions, and 22 percent was comprised of 
academic-owned. Museums were far more likely to be 
privately owned than any other type of facility.
f IgURE  8 .
MSAs with at Least One Project in 1994 and 2008.
Source: McGraw-Hill Construction, Inc.
cultural Policy center at the University of chicago SeT IN STONe   14
cHAPTER  THREE
THE INvESTMENT DETERMINANTS Of cULTURAL BUILDINg
iven that there was a great deal of variation in 
levels of building across regions and cities in the 
United States and that we saw building in areas 
where we typically would not expect it (i.e., the Southern 
region and small MSAs), attempting to identify the 
determinants of cultural building investment was also one 
of the study’s objectives. Certainly, the robustness of the 
global financial markets prior to the building boom partly 
helps to explain why the country as a whole experienced 
a surge in building. However, economic determinants 
were only one piece of the puzzle; cultural sector 
demand and the demographic composition of cities 
were two additional pieces that help explain why some 
cities built and if so, how much. The current literature 
on the relationship between city-level variables and 
cultural investment is rather sparse, and what does exist 
lacks representational qualities. Previous studies about 
the relationship between cultural investment and cities 
primarily focus on case studies, which makes it difficult 
to discuss their implications for city cultural investment in 
general. Using MSA level data for all MSAs in the United 
States, we analyzed relationships between demographic 
and economic variables and per capita investment in 
cultural building.2 We discuss what we found to be the 
primary determinants of cultural building investment, as 
well as what the implications of these findings are.
In measuring investment in cultural facilities, we used 
per capita measures. The average amount each city 
invested in a given year in cultural infrastructure was 
approximately $3.29. However, many cities also did not 
invest; in fact, 87.4 percent of cities did not invest in 
cultural infrastructure between 1994 and 2008. Thus, 
the previous average figure is greatly skewed toward 
zero. For this reason, median measures across cities 
that did invest are more telling. Out of those cities that 
invested, the median value of per capita investment was 
approximately $12.64. Per capita investment ranged from 
$0.60 to $348.56 per year among cities that invested. 
Median per capita investment among MSAs that invested 
was much higher in MSAs with fewer than 500,000 
people ($41.43) and lower in MSAs with greater than 
two million people ($5.27). If we include MSAs that did 
not invest, median per capita investment was $0 among 
MSAs with fewer than 500,000 people and $1.87 among 
MSAs with greater than two million people. The range of 
per capita investment also decreased as cities got larger. 
EffEcTS  Of  c U LTU RAL  SEc TOR vARI AB LES
The number of existing cultural facilities in a city was a 
major determinant of how much it invested in cultural 
infrastructure. We found that, for every additional cultural 
facility a city had, it invested between $0.11 and $0.23 
more per capita per year in cultural building projects. This 
might seem counter-intuitive; however, it is important 
to remember that the building projects we studied were 
not only new construction projects, but also renovations 
and additions to existing structures. Therefore, we would 
expect that the more cultural facilities a city has, the 
more it must invest in maintaining and replacing those 
facilities. 
The number of existing cultural facilities varied across 
cities and the country. The national average of cultural 
facilities was about 0.7 facilities per 10,000 people. 
Regional averages differed substantially; the Northeastern 
and Western regions had about one facility for every 
10,000 people and the Southern region had the least—0.4 
facilities for every 10,000 people. Across cities, the 
number of cultural facilities ranged from zero to 15 per 
10,000 people. The number of existing cultural facilities in 
an MSA increased exponentially relative to its population.
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f IgURE  9 . 
Box Plot (Median and Range) of Per Capita Investment  
by Size of MSA for MSAs that Invested. 
Source: McGraw-Hill Construction, Inc; Steven Ruggles, J.Trent Alexander, 
Kaie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek. 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Seris: Version 5.0 [Machine-readable  
database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010.
2 More specific information regarding the analysis are expanded upon in "The Investment Determinants of Cultural Building,"  
 (Woronkowicz, 2011) available on the study's website.
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The relationship between the level of cultural labor stock 
and per capita investment was not as clear. This may 
be because we lacked power in our analyses or simply 
because the current level of cultural labor stock may in 
fact not be a determinant of facilities investment. We 
defined cultural labor stock in two ways: in terms of the 
number of cultural managers who worked in facilities, 
and the number of artists who lived in a city. We found 
weak evidence that for every ten additional cultural 
managers, a city invested $0.01 to $0.05 less in cultural 
building projects. However, the effect was not statistically 
significant. We did analyze the relationship using several 
different statistical models and the relationship remained 
negative (albeit not significant) with every one we ran. 
We can therefore believe with some certainty that the 
relationship was truly negative. Again, this relationship 
may seem counter-intuitive at first—one would imagine 
that organizations that increase their physical size 
must also expand their staff—but since our analyses 
focused on what the determinants of investment were, 
as opposed to what the results from investing were, the 
negative relationship seems sensible. It may very well be 
that facilities expansion in the cultural sector results in an 
organization’s expansion of human resources. Our survey 
evidence suggests, though, that as a result of investing in 
projects during this period, many organizations also had 
to cut staff sizes significantly. The negative relationship 
between the number of cultural managers and per capita 
investment may just suggest that capital and labor act 
as substitutes, thus an organization that invests more in 
physical capital invests less in labor in order to produce 
goods and services. However, much more research is 
needed to determine whether or not this is the case.
By analyzing the relationship between the number 
of artists in a city and per capita investment, we saw 
the first signs that facilities investment may not have 
responded to demand from the cultural sector during the 
boom period. For every ten additional artists that lived 
in a city, it invested $0.03 less per capita in a given year. 
By analyzing the relationship in just the boom period, we 
found that for every ten additional artists, a city invested 
$0.11 less per capita. Again, the evidence was weak, but 
by estimating the relationship between the number of 
artists that lived in a city and per capita investment in 
building on all years excluding the boom period, we 
found that the direction of the relationship changed. 
Specifically, we found that for every ten additional artists 
that lived in a city, it invested between $0.06 and $0.12 
more in cultural building. Given that the direction of the 
relationship between the number of artists in a city and 
per capita investment differed when we estimated the 
model on all years from when we estimated the model 
on all years excluding the boom period, there is reason 
to believe that the boom period may have strongly 
influenced	the	results	in	all	other	years.	
We would expect that the number of artists partly 
comprises the demand for cultural facilities, thus a 
city with more artists should also have more facilities. 
In fact, as the graph below illustrates, the relationship 
between the number of artists and the number of 
existing cultural facilities is positively associated. 
Furthermore, the number of artists could be proxying 
for other characteristics of MSAs that have higher 
demand for facilities. It may indeed be a good measure 
for how culturally rich a city is, relative to another. It is 
true that visual artists typically do not work in cultural 
facilities, but performance artists frequently do. Since 
we saw greater investment in performance facilities than 
museums during this period, we could expect that the 
number of artists that lived in a city would be positively 
associated with per capita investment. However, this was 
not the case during the boom period, suggesting that the 
increase in the supply of cultural facilities may not have 
responded to an increase in demand for facilities from 
the cultural sector.
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f IgURE  10. 
Relationship between Number of existing Facilities  
in an MSA and Population.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns; Steven Ruggles, 
J.Trent Alexander, Kaie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and 
Matthew Sobek. Integrated Public Use Microdata Seris: Version 5.0 [Machine-
readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010.
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Similarly, we found weak but consistent evidence 
of the relationships between the number of cultural 
organizations in a city and both median net income 
of cultural organizations and per capita investment. 
In a survey we conducted of managers of cultural 
organizations that had building projects, we found one 
of the primary reasons to build a new facility or renovate 
an existing facility for PACs and theaters was to provide 
space for community arts groups. This was not true in 
the case of museums as they typically do not function as 
homes to multiple arts organizations but rather display 
works of art by individual artists. Again, since there was 
more investment in performance facilities between 1994 
and 2008, we hypothesized that the more arts groups 
there are in a city, the greater the need for cultural 
facilities and hence the greater the level of per capita 
investment. We found that for every one additional 
arts organization, a city invested between $0.002 and 
$0.008 less per capita. In the boom period, we found 
that for every additional organization, a city invested 
between $0.03 and $0.11 less; and in all years excluding 
the boom period, we found that for every additional arts 
organization, a city invested between $0.04 and $0.07 
more per capita. Again, the difference between each 
model’s results suggests that the boom period may have 
been	influencing	the	results	in	the	other	models.	
The average number of cultural facilities per city in our 
data outweighs the average number of arts organizations. 
On average, each city in the United States had about two 
cultural facilities for every 10,000 people, whereas each 
city had about 1.2 arts organizations for every 10,000 
people. Assuming that arts organizations partly comprise 
the demand for cultural facilities, one would expect 
that the ratio between the number of arts organizations 
and cultural facilities would be greater than one—in 
other words, there would be more arts organizations 
than facilities. However, the ratio is probably less 
than one in our data due to how we measured each 
variable. We measured the number of cultural facilities 
by using Census County Business Patterns data, which 
are disaggregated at the industry level. Therefore, the 
measure we used aggregates all cultural facilities in the 
North American Industry Classification System code for 
“Arts, entertainment and Recreation.” To measure the 
number of arts organizations, we used data from the 
National Center for Charitable Statistics. We counted 
only arts organizations that were likely to make use of 
facilities. Thus, the measure of the number of cultural 
facilities is most likely grossly overstated since it includes 
facilities in all areas of arts, entertainment, and recreation 
and therefore most likely biases the ratio of organizations 
to facilities downwards. However, by examining the trend 
of the ratio of organizations to facilities, we can partly 
see how the ratio changed over time, which gives us 
insight into whether the number of cultural facilities or 
organizations was growing faster during this period.  
On a national scale, the ratio of organizations to facilities 
increased over time, suggesting that there was more 
growth in the number of organizations than facilities. 
We proxied for the health of each MSA’s cultural sector 
by measuring the total net revenue across all arts 
organizations. The calculation for this was simply the 
difference between the sum of all organizations’ revenue 
and the sum of all organizations’ expenses. In fact, 
developing a noncontroversial way to proxy for the health 
f IgURE  12 . 
National Trend in Ratio of Arts Organizations to Cultural Facilities.
Source: National Center for Charitable Statistics; U.S. Census Bureau,  
County Business Patterns.
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Relationship between Number of existing Facilities  
in an MSA and Number of Artists.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns; Steven Ruggles, 
J.Trent Alexander, Kaie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and 
Matthew Sobek. Integrated Public Use Microdata Seris: Version 5.0 [Machine-
readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010.
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of a cultural sector was a difficult task, and we realize 
that this may not be the best measure. Nevertheless, with 
the data available to us, we found total MSA net revenue 
to be the most consistent way to measure the financial 
health of a city’s cultural sector. On average, in a given 
year, a city in the United States had total net revenue of 
$7,131,816. The range was substantial—from approximately 
negative $28.4 million to positive $1.4 billion. Larger 
MSAs with over two million in population on average 
had more net revenue than smaller MSAs with fewer 
than 500,000 in population; the average net revenue in 
a small MSA was $6,384,906, whereas the average for 
large MSAs was $10.4 million. Again, median measures 
are more telling since large organizations with substantial 
revenue are more likely to locate within large MSAs. The 
median net revenue in a small MSA was $302,055 and the 
median in a large MSA was $649,352. Smaller MSAs were 
also more likely to have negative net revenue. eighty-two 
percent of MSAs had at least one year of negative net 
revenue. Out of those, 76 percent were small MSAs and 3 
percent were large MSAs. 
We assumed that the healthier a city’s cultural sector (i.e., 
the greater the MSA net revenue), the more financially 
prepared it would be to build a cultural facility. Therefore, 
we could expect that MSA total net income would have 
a positive relationship with per capita investment. We 
found that for every additional $100,000 in net revenue, 
a city invested $0.004 to $0.01 less in cultural building. 
In the boom period, for every $100,000 in net revenue, 
a city invested $0.02 to $0.05 less in cultural building. 
And in all years excluding the boom period, for every 
$100,000 in net revenue, a city invested $0.03 to $0.06 
more in cultural building. Again, the difference between 
the relationships estimated in each period suggests that 
the	boom	period	may	have	influenced	the	results	in	the	
other periods. 
Taken together, the relationships between per capita 
investment and the number of artists, arts organizations, 
and MSA total net revenue help illustrate how the 
supply of facilities responded to demand from the 
cultural sector. We assumed that each cultural sector 
variable would have a positive effect on cultural facilities 
investment, and we found that each did in all years, 
except when we excluded the boom period years. This 
suggests that, in the boom period, increases in the supply 
of cultural facilities may not have responded to demand 
increases in the cultural sector. In fact, the evidence 
suggests that the relationships were negative during 
the boom period; either there was overinvestment in 
the supply of facilities relative to cultural sector demand 
for facilities, or facilities investment may have been 
responding to something else altogether.
EffEc TS  Of  P OP U LATI ON c HANgE,  
EDU cATI ON AND I NcOM E
We found strong evidence for population change, 
education, and income being predictors of cultural 
building investment between 1994 and 2008. In contrast 
to our findings in regards to the relationship between 
cultural sector variables and per capita investment, 
these demographic predictors remained stable and 
significant no matter what model we used to estimate 
the relationships. In general, cities that invested in cultural 
building were also on average more educated, wealthier, 
and had greater population increases during this period. 
Table D shows on average how fast each city’s population 
increased, the proportion of people who had at least  
a Bachelor’s degree (education), and median household 
income levels for cites that invested in cultural 
infrastructure versus the averages for those that did not 
invest. The differences are all significant at the 
1 percent level. 
The effects of population change, education, and median 
household income on per capita investment were all 
very strong and significant. First, the more a city’s 
population increased, the more it invested. Specifically, a 
city invested between $25.53 and $27.11 more in cultural 
infrastructure for every additional percentage by which 
its population increased. Interestingly enough, it was not 
the	size	of	a	city’s	population	that	influenced	how	much	it	
invested	in	cultural	infrastructure,	rather	what	influenced	
cultural investment was how fast a city’s population was 
increasing (or decreasing). 
education is perhaps the best predictor of arts 
participation according to literature on the demand for 
the arts. Therefore, we also hypothesized that more 
educated cities—measured as the proportion of people 
with at least a Bachelor’s degree—would invest more in 
cultural infrastructure. This is, of course, based on the 
premise that educated people participate in the arts via 
traditional cultural facilities. No doubt, arts participation 
also occurs in informal settings such as alternative 
spaces, including churches, schools, and one’s own home. 
We found that for every additional percentage that a 
city’s population was comprised of college graduates, it 
invested between $154.90 and $186.69 more per capita 
per year in cultural building projects. At first, this seems 
like a rather unbelievable statistic. However, demographic 
changes generally occur over a long period. According to 
Census data, the percentage of college graduates in the 
United States increased only 1 percent from 1983 to 1993, 
and about 5 percent from 1993 to 2003. The average 
change in the percentage of college graduates in cities 
across the United States was only about seven-tenths of 
a percentage point.  
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TABLE  D.
Average Population Change, education, and Median Household Income Levels for MSAs that Invested versus MSAs that Did Not Invest.
Source: McGraw-Hill Construction, Inc; Steven Ruggles, J.Trent Alexander, Kaie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek.  
Integrated Public Use Microdata Seris: Version 5.0 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010.
Finally, median household income—our measure of 
the wealth of an MSA—was positively and statistically 
significantly associated with per capita investment. For 
every additional $1000 in an MSA’s median household 
income, it invested between $1.69 and $1.76 more 
per capita per year in cultural building. In addition to 
education, income was consistently the best predictor of 
city cultural facilities investment. Furthermore, it was still 
a good predictor even though the measure of income we 
used may not have illustrated how the wealth of an MSA 
actually impacts cultural facilities investment. We need 
to keep in mind that it is not the general MSA population 
that contributes financially to cultural building projects, 
but rather it is a small group of people whose income 
lies in the far right tail of the distribution. In other words, 
those who donate to cultural infrastructure projects 
are usually the wealthiest members of the community, 
and therefore a better measure of income might be the 
percentage of a city’s population that are millionaires, 
for example. Currently, there are no consistent data 
of this kind on all MSAs in the United States. even 
without a good measure, income still proved to be a 
strong predictor of how much a city invests in cultural 
infrastructure. 
cONcLUSIONS
It should be noted that the analysis of the relationships 
between how much a city invests in cultural building 
and the array of possible determinants is only the 
first step in accurately assessing what in reality these 
relationships are. The research we have done lays 
important groundwork, but much more research in this 
domain is needed if we want to be confident about our 
findings, and about the implications of these results. A 
good next step will be to attempt to specify further a 
theory of cultural infrastructure investment and focus 
exclusively on one or two relationships of interest. For 
example, since the findings in our work provide strong 
evidence for population change, education, and wealth as 
important determinants of cultural building investment, 
future work should focus on defining and measuring 
cultural sector demand and analyzing the relationships 
between supply and demand more precisely. Honing in 
on these relationships could potentially provide incredibly 
useful information for practitioners making the decision 
of whether or not to build projects in the future. 
c HAP TER  fOU R: 
THE  fEASI B I L I TY  Of  c U LTU RAL  
B U I LDI Ng P ROjEc TS
one of the research we conducted on cultural 
building would be in any way helpful if 
practitioners could not use the information to 
improve on and develop effective practices for planning 
and managing capital facilities projects. For this reason, 
another goal of the study was to analyze the planning 
and building processes of completed projects in order 
to describe precisely how they unfolded, in turn better 
enabling practitioners to learn from project successes 
and failures and to apply what they learn to managing 
future projects.3  
Defining success in cultural building is an intrinsically 
complicated endeavor. First, the stated goals of building 
projects vary dramatically and sometimes extend well 
beyond the organization’s borders. For example, projects 
are designed to revitalize a neighborhood, to anchor 
a new arts district, to make a city more attractive to 
senior corporate employees, to help attract tourists, 
or to enhance civic pride and community. even within 
the confines of the organizations themselves, defining 
success is difficult because organizational goals vary 
enormously and are difficult to measure in terms of 
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3  More specific information regarding the analysis is expanded upon in "The Feasibility of Cultural Building Projects," (Woronkowicz, 2011) available  
 on the study's website. See Appendix II for a copy of materials in the Manager’s Survey, including the questionnaire.
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achievement. Very rarely do organizations develop 
specific ex-ante metrics for a project’s goals by which 
one can measure success. For this reason we conducted 
extensive interviews with representatives of these 
building projects to pinpoint what the goals of the 
project were and to determine how they were achieved. 
Surprisingly, it is also difficult to measure financial success 
based on an organization’s accounting data. Because 
the sample consisted only of buildings that were actually 
completed, we did not see evidence of financial failure 
resulting in abandoned projects. We did a sweep of 
all the building projects to see how many had to close 
their doors, and we found that few organizations were 
actually forced to take this kind of drastic measure. 
Therefore, rather than defining success in absolute 
terms, we identified characteristics within each category 
of building project that we believe led to more or less 
successful projects. We did this by analyzing the sample 
data and applying it to a framework that we developed 
which categorizes success on four different dimensions: 
the project’s motivation, its leadership, its planning and 
building processes, and its outcomes.  
We separated the sample of 56 projects into four 
categories—museums, producing theaters, resident PACs, 
and nonresident PACs—in order to analyze the data in 
a manner that would be maximally useful for managers. 
Museums and producing theaters are defined as the 
study as a whole defines them. Resident and nonresident 
PACs were categorized based on their primary reasons 
for operating. The former are facilities whose primary 
purpose is to provide a home to community arts groups. 
These groups—large or small—either perform at the PAC 
facility and in additional facilities in the community, or 
in the PAC facility exclusively. But the PAC does tend 
to provide a stable base out of which the arts group or 
groups can operate. By contrast, nonresident PACs host 
other arts groups as renters, not lessees. In other words, 
the relationship between the facility and the arts group 
is significantly more distanced, or held at “arm’s length,” 
than that between resident PACs and groups. Rather than 
serving as a home to the arts group and having a large 
part of its mission devoted to helping nurture them, the 
facility provides space to arts groups on an as needed 
basis, and more in the form of a business relationship. 
These types of facilities are often in the business of 
hosting Broadway tours, or renting out space to local 
amateur arts groups. The sample of projects we studied 
in depth included 19 museums, 9 producing theaters,  
12 resident PACs, and 16 nonresident PACs.
We devised objective measures within each category 
to help identify important characteristics that we are 
confident lead to more or less successful projects on the 
four dimensions listed above.
•	 The	project’s	motivation,	simply	put,	was	the	primary		
 purpose for building. In determining what helps 
 projects be successful in this dimension, we looked 
 carefully at whether the project was driven by both 
 the organization’s artistic mission and by organizational  
 need.
•	 Using	the	data	on	the	sample	of	projects,	we	also		
 looked at what helped projects succeed in terms of 
 their leadership. Here, we looked at whether there was 
 both clarity and consistency of leadership throughout 
 the planning and building process. 
•	 In	order	to	determine	what	helped	projects	succeed	in	
 implementation, we looked at how efficient the project 
 timelines were and how effective the project’s leaders 
 were in responding to internal and external feedback. 
•	 Finally,	we	looked	at	how	the	project	was	able		
	 to	control	its	expenses	and	also	how	flexible	the	
 organization was in generating revenue post-project 
 completion in regards to project outcomes. 
There are, predictably, significant anomalies within each 
category of project where a specific project did not 
necessarily align with the overall theme of the category. 
For example, even though we discuss how the motivation 
to build a producing theater was typically driven by a 
strong and clearly articulated artistic mission, there were 
in fact some producing theaters that we studied where 
this was not the case. Furthermore, there were projects 
in other categories where the reason to build may have 
also been driven by a strong artistic mission, but the 
overall theme did not include this as a characteristic of 
the majority of projects in that category. The purpose 
of separating the sample projects into four categories, 
and identifying the overarching themes in each category, 
was not based on the assumption that all the projects 
in a given category were the same; it was to be able to 
say that a majority of projects in a particular category 
exhibited certain behaviors or characteristics, and that 
these specific behaviors or characteristics of the project 
are therefore important to consider when planning and 
building a cultural facility of any type. In other words, in 
evaluating each category of project, we try to emphasize 
that it is not the category that is more (or less) successful, 
but rather the characteristic(s) of that category that 
helped make more projects in the category succeed. 
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By analyzing the data on the sample of projects, we 
were essentially able to locate each category of project 
on the grid shown in Figure 13 in order to illustrate the 
characteristics of the category that helped make the 
project successful. The closer the category of project is 
located to the center of the grid, the more we observed 
those characteristics. The further away, the less we 
observed them.
OBSERvATIONS  Of  PRODUcINg THEATER S
Quite often the motivation to build a theater stemmed 
from a clear organizational need to further develop 
artistic programming. This could encompass better 
production amenities and technology, or the creation 
of	more	flexible	space	in	order	to	enable	different	types	
of work. The project was devoted to furthering the 
organization’s artistic mission, which was kept front  
and center throughout the developmental stages of  
the project. 
Theaters, on the whole, also had very clear and 
consistent leadership. Clarity came from the fact that 
it was often not hard to identify who the leader of the 
project was at any given time. Consistency, on the other 
hand, was implemented when the same leader was 
retained throughout the entire course of the project. 
And it was often the case with theater projects that 
the person who proposed the project (most often the 
director) was the same person who ended up opening 
the facility and running its operations. The leader also 
collaborated closely with the board of directors—often a 
comparatively	large	and	influential	group	for	these	types	
of projects. 
Theaters also engaged in very short and efficient project 
timelines. On average, a theater would take about seven 
years to plan and complete. Notably, these projects 
most often utilized feedback from constituencies. 
By responding to feedback from constituencies who 
actually used the facility (i.e., resident companies), 
theaters characteristically custom-tailored their capital 
improvements, and by doing so, assured their usefulness. 
These types of organizations tended to listen and 
respond to feedback from external constituencies as 
well, but they also seemed to be skilled at knowing what 
type of feedback was useful and what was not. 
Surprisingly, theaters also had the highest budget 
overruns as measured from the moment the budget was 
first agreed upon to the project’s end cost. On average, a 
theater’s end cost was approximately 92 percent greater 
than its initial budget. Table e lists the average budget 
escalation for each category of project. 
However, the starting budget was usually an internal 
figure and these projects’ managers were clever about 
when to announce their budgets publicly so that the 
escalations did not appear outrageous to the community. 
Interestingly, the publicly perceived escalations were 
often much lower—an average of about 19 percent. 
More importantly, the escalations that did occur often 
had a clear connection to organizational needs and 
were seen as helping the organization pursue its artistic 
mission. In this respect, budget increases were rarely 
perfunctory. And, even if post-building operating 
performance wavered, these organizations usually had 
enough support in place to prevent a financial crisis from 
erupting. Post-project philanthropic support from their 
large and characteristically committed boards remained 
reliable from the moment the project began to well after 
it was completed and fully operational. 
OB SERvATI ONS  Of  M U SEU M S
Museums differed from theaters slightly, particularly in 
regard to the motivation for the project. Most often, the 
primary reason for building a museum was to make an 
architectural statement either related to the prestige of 
the institution or the civic pride of the community. It was 
frequently difficult to identify whether in fact the reason 
to build stemmed directly from the organization’s artistic 
f IgURE  13 . 
Dimensions of Cultural Building Project Feasibility.
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mission. Furthermore, since the stature and originality of 
the architect and the architect’s vision was often central 
in these projects, these types of facilities had very 
ambitious design-related goals that the organization did 
not, in practical terms, always need. 
Similar to producing theaters, museum projects had 
relatively clear and consistent leadership. However, the 
leadership for these projects was often more shared in 
the sense that these organizations’ very strong boards 
sometimes meddled with or complicated the strategic 
plan during the course of the project. Therefore, it was 
sometimes quite unclear who the actual leader(s) was 
as compared to whom leadership was formally vested 
in. The lack of clarity between the actual and assumed 
leader sometimes stirred up a good bit of controversy, 
which tended to lead to greater turnover on these 
project’s boards. Museum projects, then, exhibited less 
consistency in their leadership than did theater projects. 
In terms of their planning and building processes, 
museums had somewhat longer project timelines than 
theaters. On average, it took a museum project about 
nine years to plan and build from the time someone 
first proposed the project to when the facility opened 
its doors to the public. Museums, however, had shorter 
periods of time between a project proposal and the 
hiring of consultants, who tended to be called in during 
the very early planning stages to conduct feasibility 
studies and assess the organization’s potential for 
fundraising. The long building period for museums 
overall could be attributed to the strong architectural 
focus of these types of projects. Museums considered, 
on average, a substantially greater number of designs 
than other types of projects in our sample; in fact they 
considered about ten designs before they decided 
on the final one. Architectural plans were approved 
and then later scrapped prior to building, or at least 
heavily edited after the project broke ground. The “cost 
cutting” amendments—or “value engineering”—to the 
architectural plans of these types of projects caused 
building to take longer than initially anticipated. In 
these projects the needs of both internal and external 
constituencies were reviewed; however, there were 
often lengthy debates in regard to the opposition 
project leadership encountered around the proposed 
architectural design. Museum projects were therefore not 
as strategic and deliberate in how they dealt with project 
feedback as were theaters. 
Budget escalations—measured from the time the budget 
was first approved to its final cost—were not as severe; 
on average, the budget for museums went over only 
by about 46 percent. However, budget increases were 
almost always due to architectural additions, and many 
of these were not vital to the project’s success. Once 
museums—and any type of project, for that matter—
made the decision to hire a star architect, they often 
had difficulty with rejecting the architect’s proposed 
additions after the original budget was set in place. 
These	types	of	facilities	were	also	much	less	flexible	with	
generating revenue post-project completion than other 
categories were. Museums that experienced financial 
trouble responded by reducing programming, but the 
built-in costs and revenues of these organizations made 
it more difficult and disruptive to reduce their program 
operating deficits by downsizing. We observed cutbacks 
and elimination of important ancillary programming 
such as education programs. Struggling museums also 
reduced or eliminated expensive special exhibitions that 
had often been booked years earlier, and focused instead 
on their permanent collections. Finally, museums would 
sometimes reduce their hours and the days on which 
they were open, or would perhaps darken part of the 
facility on a rotating basis. 
OB SERvATI ONS  Of  NONRESI DENT  PAc S
Within the category of nonresident PACs there was 
a strong focus on community in nearly all aspects of 
these projects. The primary motivation for these types 
of projects often stemmed directly from what the 
community wanted or felt it needed. However, more 
often than not, community need for the nonresident 
PAC was not accurately determined. For example, a 
large majority of these projects used economic impact 
arguments as rationales for building. Included in these 
arguments was the implicit assumption that by building a 
cultural facility in a blighted area, it would automatically 
attract and sustain a substantial audience who would 
not otherwise have ventured there. Nine times out of 
ten, these assumptions were not accurately tested, and 
when the facility project was completed, the desired 
TABLE  E .  
Average Budget escalation.
PRODUcINg THEATRES
92%
MUSEU M S
46%
NONRESI DENT  PAcS
6 2%
RESI DENT  PAcS
6 4%
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swarm of activity never materialized. Therefore, while 
these projects might have identified a perceived need 
for the building to exist, what was perceived was not 
always accurate. Moreover, the reason for building lacked 
a visible and persuasive connection to the organization’s 
artistic mission. Since the motivation for the project  
was so strongly centered in the desire to culturally enrich 
the broader community in a necessarily general way, 
a specific organizational artistic mission (if there was 
one) was often swept aside or obscured by a general 
enthusiasm for the idea of building a new arts facility for 
local residents.
The leadership for nonresident PACs frequently included 
both internal and external parties, but was dominated 
by the latter. Internal parties included future executive 
directors or board members, and external ones included 
local philanthropists and civic leaders. There was often 
not a clear definition of who the leader was at any 
given time. It may have been that an assumed leader 
was a local business figure who made all of the financial 
decisions for the project and that he or she collaborated 
intermittently with the executive director, who in turn 
made all of the programming choices. Or the attorney on 
the board handled the legal affairs and rarely interacted 
with the project’s biggest donor, who was making all of 
the design specifications. This type of shared leadership 
across all parties was common in these types of projects. 
While sharing responsibilities for the project with area 
experts from an array of different fields certainly helped 
create efficiencies in managing the project, there also 
tended to be a lack of transparency demonstrated 
by all parties, making it difficult to know exactly what 
had transpired in certain components of the project. In 
other words, information often got lost in the crowd, 
and there was not one person who was responsible 
for knowing everything. Because external parties were 
heavily involved in the management of nonresident 
PACs, leadership for these projects was also inconsistent. 
Sometimes leaders opted out before the project was 
completed; in other instances, those who helped lead the 
project to completion were not around after the project 
opened. Because the leaders for these projects were 
usually heavily engaged in other endeavors unrelated 
to the project—such as a business leader who made 
the financial decisions but who also had to run his own 
company—some project leaders had to reduce their role 
substantially if their other responsibilities all of a sudden 
took priority. And the project would suffer as a result.
In terms of processes, nonresident PACs took less time 
to build than museums, but they were less efficient 
overall. On average, nonresident PACs took about eight 
years to plan and build. Within this timeline, they had 
longer pre-pre-planning stages than museums and 
theaters did. It often took substantial effort and time to 
set the project in motion after it was initially proposed. 
Theaters and museums very often hired a consultant to 
take care of this task. With nonresident PACs, the delay 
in implementation was sometimes due to the time it took 
to decide on and then enlist a leadership group. 
One clear finding was that these projects had more 
difficulty in managing the feedback they received 
from both internal and external constituencies than 
did museums and theaters. As devoted as these 
projects were to considering the needs and desires 
of their communities, this often caused a great deal 
of complication and lost time in terms of how the 
project progressed. Managing the needs and wants 
of the broader community, for whom these projects 
were ostensibly built, was an extremely complex, 
convoluted, and sensitive process. If, for example, an 
historic preservation community group wanted to save 
a landmark from being damaged or removed, but the 
developer decided to try to build anyway, negotiating 
between the parties became an all-consuming task. 
Often, these projects aimed more than they should 
have at appeasing the community as a whole, making 
substantial efforts to avoid stepping on toes. Finally, 
as mentioned earlier, in some cases the organizational 
leadership operated on mistaken assumptions regarding 
what the community was indicating it really needed. This 
in turn sometimes led to protracted negotiations, and 
sometimes to irresolvable impasses.
In general, budgets for nonresident PACs were kept 
under control. Also, these projects were able to remain 
quite	flexible	in	terms	of	generating	necessary	revenue.	
On average, budgets for nonresident PACs escalated 
about 62 percent from the initial proposal to the 
completed project, and most of the budget increases 
came in the form of time lost in decision-making 
meetings or because of inaccurate cost projections. 
While budget escalations for these projects were 
generally higher than for museums, nonresident PACs 
had an easier time closing operating gaps in the wake 
of project completion. In general, nonresident PACs 
had relatively low fixed operating costs as compared 
to other projects. They had to maintain the building, 
operate a virtual and/or physical box office, and have a 
small staff to program and run the facility. Other costs 
were directly related to performances; in general, the 
distressed nonresident PAC simply responded by having 
fewer of them. For the nonresident PACs in our sample, 
rising expenses were most often followed by decreasing 
revenues, and hence decreasing expenses. This strategy 
helped lower the overall program deficit nonresidents 
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faced down the line. By visiting the websites of these 
organizations, however, one can see easily enough that 
this often meant a dramatic reduction in institutional 
programming.
OBSERvATIONS  Of  RES IDENT  PAcS
Finally, our observations of resident PACs helped 
us identify a number of characteristics that may 
influence	the	success	of	a	project,	particularly	in	
regards to leadership and organizational processes. 
These institutions faced a much more complex set of 
issues surrounding building projects and thus often 
had commensurately complex planning and building 
processes. Their facilities were typically larger than 
nonresident PACs, and they often had in place both 
rehearsal and office space for resident companies. In 
contrast with nonresident PACs—which were often gut 
renovations of existing theaters (often movie theaters) 
with necessarily limited ability to devote space to 
lobbies, catering halls, and other amenities that today’s 
audiences expect—resident PACs were mostly new 
construction and new organizations, and many devoted 
substantial space for these ancillary activities, many of 
which also constituted sources of revenue. 
The motivation for the project often came from the 
current or future resident companies, and their need for 
a home or a space in which to operate more efficiently. 
For example, the local symphony yearned for a space 
with better acoustics, or the local ballet had grown tired 
of moving constantly from one (frequently substandard) 
local venue to another. So, organizational need for new 
space was often at the heart of the pressure for a new 
facility.	However,	the	need	was	also	frequently	conflated	
by an organizational desire (often not made explicit but 
there nonetheless) for a space that would somehow 
carry the organization to the next level. A symphony 
orchestra, for example, thought they needed a better 
acoustical space in order to elevate the prestige of their 
organization. And the implicit assumption that a better 
facility would inexorably lead to greater organizational 
success often caused organizations to take larger risks 
than they would have if aspirations to be the best in their 
artistic field were not such a strong driver. 
Since the motivation for building often came from the 
artistic groups that would operate within the facility, 
it also makes perfect sense that these projects were 
often solely based on artistry and artistic mission. The 
problems, however, arose from the clash of multiple 
resident companies’ artistic missions. Planning a facility 
that needed to respond to and help foster multiple 
groups’ artistic missions was an extremely complicated 
and often intrinsically impossible task. 
For a variety of reasons, leadership for these projects 
was often strikingly unstable. In the first place, the 
organizations for which they were being built were very 
often new entities simultaneously starting a new artistic 
enterprise and pursuing a major capital project. So, it 
was not surprising that leadership for these projects, and 
the organizations sponsoring them, was neither clear 
nor consistent. In our sample, the number of leadership 
transitions that occurred from the time the project was 
initially proposed to when it opened its doors to the 
public was striking. As mentioned, it was often one or 
more resident companies that proposed the idea of a 
new or renovated facility, and thus (frequently by default 
rather than because of a considered decision) the 
company’s director served as the initial project manager. 
Leadership then may have later been transferred to 
either an owner’s representative or to the new facility’s 
leading board member, and then again later to the 
executive director of the facility (once that person was 
in place). 
In addition to the leadership transitions that were 
planned, there were many unplanned ones that occurred 
because of a poor or inappropriate fit. Many resident 
PACs we studied had executive director turnover shortly 
after the facility opened, which in turn prolonged the 
already challenging start-up period the organization 
had to undergo. Coupled with chronic instability in the 
leadership ranks, sometimes there was also confusion 
about who exactly was in charge of a building project. 
Because these facilities were largely backed by multiple 
resident companies, and because there were often 
new layers of executive staff to facilitate collaboration 
between the various groups, project “ownership” at 
times became muddled and confused. For example, 
the director of a resident company who had been with 
the project from the outset was expected to relinquish 
control when the new executive director came on board. 
But this did not always happen, and it could (and often 
did), make for a tense state of affairs when it came to 
decision-making. Because these projects had substantial 
emotional weight in terms of how much they meant 
to the self-conception and public stature of resident 
companies, it was not always as simple as assuming 
someone would easily give up the responsibility they 
had, and felt they needed, in order to ensure the success 
of the project.
The planning and building processes also tended to 
be quite complicated for these types of facilities. On 
average, the resident PACs in our sample took 12 years 
from the time the project was first proposed to when 
the facility opened its doors. This did not include the 
years preceding the actual proposal for a new building 
project, when people were most likely already talking 
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and thinking about its feasibility, something many 
respondents in the survey talked about. One resident 
PAC in our sample took 23 years to get through this 
process—by that time, its organization’s needs and goals 
had changed substantially. Part of what was required 
throughout the process in this case was designating 
someone to address the issue of managing how exactly 
these changes affected the project. These types of 
projects also experienced changes in actual (as opposed 
to proposed) opening dates much more frequently than 
did other types of organizations, which necessitated 
the rescheduling of opening night celebrations, the 
re-booking of artists, and the managing of community 
expectations about when the project would in fact be 
available to the public. 
Similar to nonresident PACs, resident PACs had long pre-
pre-planning stages. Unlike the nonresident PACs, who 
spent their time trying to round up a viable leadership 
group for a building project, the pre-pre-planning stage 
for resident PACs was often used to decipher each 
resident company’s motivation for and involvement in 
the project. Figuring out not only which groups would 
be resident companies, but also the exact nature of 
the relation between each group and how they would 
collaborate, was a predictably daunting and time-
consuming task. It is fair to say, then, that the difficulties 
these organizations had in sorting out leadership issues 
contributed to the cost of these projects, at least in 
the form of lost time. In addition, the pre-planning 
stage—measured from when a consultant was first 
hired to when the project budget was first approved by 
the board—was usually very lengthy as well. This too 
was usually a function of managing how the groups 
collaborated.
In terms of how project leaders used the feedback they 
got concerning the design of the new facility, most of 
the time spent in this domain was in figuring out how 
to manage the input from multiple artistic groups. If it 
was the case that the new facility would be the home 
to groups from different disciplines, it was very likely 
that their needs, in terms of what exactly the new space 
could and would end up doing, varied drastically. For 
example, while the symphony may have made top-
notch acoustics their priority, the ballet would probably 
care more about stage width and depth, and getting a 
sprung	floor	installed.	Negotiating	these	competing	and	
sometimes clashing needs required time and effort. 
Finally, one of the most complicated tasks in analyzing 
these projects was trying to decipher their operating 
revenue and expenses—particularly when multiple 
artistic groups collaborated, which they often did. It 
became clear to us that it was not sufficient to simply 
look at the umbrella facility’s finances to assess whether 
or not these projects were successful. Resident PACs 
played a key role in promoting the activities of their 
resident companies. To paint a clear and detailed picture 
we would have had to have access to the finances 
for each resident company, as well as documents 
describing their contractual relationships, because 
PACs and their resident companies shared the risk 
of joint financial performance. However, the data we 
were permitted to see did not include details of the 
financial relationships between PACs and resident 
companies, and we did not collect data from or interview 
resident companies. Nonetheless, we have been able to 
come to some conclusions about how these projects 
controlled	their	expenses	and	how	flexible	they	were	
in generating revenue based on the data we did have. 
First, resident PACs were the costliest among all the 
different categories of projects. On average, they cost 
approximately $109 million to build and went about 64 
percent over their initial proposed budgets. On a per-
seat basis, the median dollar per seat for resident PACs 
was $37,527, compared to $12,155 for nonresident PACs. 
In	terms	of	these	projects’	flexibility	in	generating	
revenue, if the joint entities struggled to cover the costs 
of meeting their missions, the distress would be felt 
by some or all of the resident companies, the PAC, or 
both. The process of devising and then implementing 
an appropriate response could be challenging as it 
likely involved managing relationships such that it took 
resources from the less distressed entities to cover 
expenses. Renegotiating these contracts was often 
slow, inefficient, contentious, and generally distressing. 
In addition, the nonresident PAC strategy of reducing 
the number of performances was much less attractive, 
in particular because the resident companies had large 
salary obligations to artists, management, and others 
that required a steady and substantial performance 
revenue stream. Resident PAC distress could result in the 
failure of resident companies or their departure from the 
PAC as they sought out more affordable performance 
space. The PAC might well then find itself becoming 
more of a rental or presenting house, bringing in outside 
performers. 
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Based on the analysis we performed of the data, we 
were able to locate each category of project on the grid 
illustrated earlier in the chapter (Figure 13) and thus 
come to some conclusions about what characteristics 
helped lead to project success. each category’s 
proximity to the center of the grid indicates where we 
observed characteristics that most frequently led to 
successful building projects within each dimension.
Based on the results of our analyses of the feasibility 
of cultural building projects, we could have come up 
with a set of normative guidelines for practitioners, 
however, doing so would be neither helpful nor accurate. 
In order to dole out prescriptive advice for how to plan 
and manage building projects, we would be obliged 
to demonstrate that the opposite would lead to failed 
projects. Since we could not observe what projects did 
not do, however, we cannot say that what they did not 
do would lead to failure. This is simply an example of 
the longstanding analytical problem of not being able to 
observe the counterfactual. However, our observations 
did show certain characteristics of building projects that 
project managers can pay attention to in order to help 
ensure their feasibility. 
For example, in terms of the motivation for embarking 
on a building project, a project manager needs to look 
carefully at both the demonstrated need for the project 
(and how substantiated that need is), and the degree 
to which the project is driven by the organization’s 
artistic mission. In the discussion above, we provided our 
observations of how theaters, museums, nonresident 
PACs, and resident PACs typically did this in the sample 
of projects we studied. It is up to practioners, then, 
to decide whether or not paying attention to these 
characteristics actually helps them to maximize the 
chances for the project’s success, and how, specifically, 
to do this on a sustained basis throughout the life of 
the project. 
eaching through case studies is a pedagogical  
f IgURE  14 . 
Dimensions of Cultural Building 
Project Feasibility by Category  
of Project.
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tool used in many graduate and executive 
education courses. Most such case studies are not 
mere illustrations of best and worst practices, but 
rather portrayals of complex situations similar to those 
students are likely to encounter in the world outside the 
classroom. At the center of each study, there is usually a 
manager attempting to decide among several alternative 
courses of action, each with its potential benefits and 
risks. This makes case studies useful tools for illustrating 
and teaching management concepts. 
The teaching cases produced for this study are written 
to illustrate the interactions and tensions between 
the principal forces that animate cultural building 
projects. When reading and discussing these studies in 
a classroom, students might be asked to debate which 
of the many courses of action available should be taken 
and how various goals might be prioritized. The four 
cases produced as the result of this effort are intended to 
enable discussions of the challenges that are frequently 
encountered by cultural building projects in the arts. 
The case studies are summarized below and available for 
download from the Cultural Policy Center website. 
case Study #1: The board and directors of the Art 
Institute of chicago must balance the demands of 
responsible fiscal stewardship of their institution, the 
pressure to begin construction on the new wing they had 
announced years before, and the desire to incorporate 
new and exciting but expensive ideas into the final 
design. 
case Study #2: Civic leaders in Dallas, Texas, must decide 
whether to embark on an ambitious $300 million capital 
campaign to build a new PAC despite warnings that the 
fundraising goal is too ambitious. This extraordinary goal 
is actually met, but then the campaign goal is raised, and 
raised again, until the new PAC opens with the expanded 
capital campaign unfinished and the endowment 
campaign barely begun. After opening, the new AT&T 
Performing Arts center must struggle with finding the 
balance between financial sustainability and its goal of 
delivering community benefits commensurate with the 
large investment of philanthropic capital.
case Study #3: After a capital campaign stalls, leaders of 
the Long center for the Performing Arts in Austin, Texas, 
must change the project’s scope in order to reduce the 
budget. This process requires the re-examination of every 
assumption about the importance of each feature in the 
design program, from number of venues to quality of 
architecture and acoustics. Additionally, they must rethink 
how they articulate their vision in order to gain 
community support.
case Study #4: In Roanoke, Virginia, the art museum 
embarks on the facility planning process with the humble 
goal of expanding its gallery space, but over time, and 
partially inspired by the Guggenheim Bilbao, it decides 
to build a sprawling $68 million architectural landmark 
so as to redefine the city’s identity and boost economic 
development. The post-modernist design proves 
controversial as well as more expensive than originally 
anticipated. Once the new Taubman Museum of Art 
opens, attendance is far below estimates, while the cost 
of operating the new facility is far above them. To balance 
its books, the museum is forced into multiple rounds of 
layoffs and drastic increases in its admission charges. 
cHAP TER  S I x : 
THE  EffEcTS  ON cOMMUNIT IES
t is not uncommon for economic decisions to have 
consequences beyond the people and organizations 
most directly involved in individual cultural building 
projects, and economists have extensively studied such 
“externality” and “spillover” effects. Because so many 
outside factors—including even the number of other 
cultural	organizations	in	the	community—can	influence	
attendance, ticket revenues, fundraising, programming, 
and access to talented labor, a mere documentation of 
such indices of arts organization performance before 
and after targeted building projects will not suffice 
to understand such potential externalities. Therefore, 
two other types of evidence are emphasized: 1) the 
perceptions of a large sample of non-building community 
cultural organizations regarding the effects of a major 
local cultural building project on their own organizations 
and the broader cultural community, and 2) the sources 
of funding for the construction phases of the building 
projects, since the economic impacts on jobs, economic 
output and incomes, and local tax revenues depend 
in part on the injection of new spending into the local 
economy from outside sources, in contrast to the mere 
diversion of local spending from one sector or type of 
project to another. 4
cHAPTER  f IvE : 
c ASE  ST UDIES
T
I
4 See Appendix III for a copy of materials in the Community Survey, including the questionnaire.
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Of course, while there is potential for much to be learned 
about the spillover effects of cultural building projects 
by focusing on the perceived effects of a particular 
project on other organizations, any one building project 
exists in the context of a broader array of such projects 
that can either improve or complicate the economic 
and artistic positions of the wider population of cultural 
organizations. Therefore, it is important to document 
the broader cultural building context in any community 
when attempting to identify the perceived effects of 
a particular high-profile project on the other community 
organizations.
The primary data used for exploring the community 
spillover effects of cultural building expansion come 
from a community survey administered to 444 arts 
organizations in 13 MSAs. These MSAs are identified in 
Table F along with important features of the total cultural 
building in those MSAs from roughly 1998 to 2008. 
Clearly, of the cities in the community survey, Chicago 
experienced the most building in terms of total projects, 
but when adjusted for MSA population, Chicago was 
about average among the 13 cities. Furthermore, smaller 
MSAs, such as Omaha and Austin, rank very high in 
terms of total building projects per million people in the 
population. The total construction cost per project was 
highest in Minneapolis and lowest in Phoenix, and in 
terms of the additional square feet of space created per 
capita in these MSAs over this period, the smaller cities 
of Austin, Kansas City, and Omaha rank highest. The last 
column of data confirms the relatively poor performance 
of the overall economy in the last decade, with seven 
of the 13 MSAs experiencing negative growth rates in 
overall employment from 2001 to 2011, with Austin being 
the positive outlier at 14.9 percent growth; Washington, 
DC, 10.2 percent growth; and San Francisco 
demonstrating the poorest performance with a drop of 
11.3 percent in total employment. 
There was no statistically significant relationship 
between any of these broader MSA ten-year building 
characteristics and the average community organization 
favorable response to the most general question about 
the overall community impact of the targeted building 
project. That is, the average MSA positive response to 
the question: “Was the overall impact of the project 
on other cultural organizations in the area positive, 
negative, or did not have an impact?” was 64 percent, 
ranging from a high of 83 percent for community 
organizations in Omaha to a low of 44 percent for 
organizations in Dallas. The other results were: Atlanta, 
73 percent; Austin, 71 percent; Chicago, 49 percent; 
TABLE  f. 
Summary of MSAs in the Community Survey.
Source: McGraw-Hill Construction, Inc., U.S. Conference of Mayors.
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Cincinnati, 75 percent; Washington, DC, 72 percent; 
Kansas City, 54 percent; Minneapolis, 53 percent; 
Philadelphia, 58 percent; Phoenix, 69 percent; Portland, 
Oregon, 61 percent; and San Francisco, 73 percent. 
When analyzed in a multivariate regression setting, none 
of the community building characteristics performed 
well as predictors of this overall positive reaction to the 
community impact of the targeted project. 
In reporting the perceived community impacts of the 
targeted building project for each of the 13 cities, it is 
important to describe some additional features of the 
444 interviewed organizations, especially in terms of 
how they identified themselves relative to the expanding 
organization. Table G reports the most important of the 
subsamples	reflecting	these	characteristics.		
Based on this description of the underlying sample of 
responding organizations, about 54 percent self-identify 
as not being closely linked to the expansion project 
based on competitor or location status. However, 41 
percent are linked by at least location, being in the same 
“district.” Approximately 11 percent perceive themselves 
as direct competitors, with nearly 6 percent perceiving 
themselves to be most closely linked by being both 
direct competitors and located in the same district. 
These perceptions of being or not being a competitor 
or being located in the same district as the organization 
engaged in building turned out to be a notable factor 
in determining how the responding community 
organizations perceived the spillover effects of such 
building projects. 
As important examples of the role that competitive 
status plays in the perception of the community-wide 
effects of individual building projects, the following 
particular results are especially noteworthy: 
•	 Competitor	organizations	are	notably	less	enthusiastic		
 about overall community impact of the expansion  
 projects: less than 50 percent saw positive impacts,  
 compared to an average positive perception of 63  
 percent for other subsamples.
•	 All	subsamples	report	less	than	70	percent	positive		
 community impacts, with the most enthusiastic group  
 being those in the same district, but not being direct  
 competitors (69 percent positive).  
•	 Organizations	that	are	either	competitors	or	located		
 in the same district are substantially more likely to  
 believe the expansion project had some effects on  
 their programs or exhibits, with an average “yes”  
 answer of 29 percent over five subsamples, compared  
 to only 14 percent “yes” answers over the other three  
 subsamples. However, specific programmatic effects  
 are either minimal or modestly positive, with almost  
 no effects at all on those surveyed organizations that  
 are museums. 
•	 Even	though	organizations	with	closer	connections	to		
 expansion projects are clearly more affected by those  
 projects, the absolute impact seems relatively small,  
 with the highest subsample perceiving any effects  
 on programs or exhibits being 32 percent for those  
 organizations that are both competitors and in the  
 same district as the expansion project. 
When thinking about possible negative externality 
effects on other organizations of a particular building 
project, the potential for adversely affecting those other 
organizations’ audience attendance, earned revenues, 
and total patronage comes readily to mind. On the 
other hand, a more optimistic assessment of how 
one organization’s expansion might generate positive 
spillover benefits often highlights the potential for 
attracting new businesses to the neighborhood, and 
TABLE  g . 
Subsamples of Interviewed Community Organizations.
Note: The total number of organizations interviewed was 444. Due to item nonresponse for some cases, the totals among mutually exclusive 
categories (i.e. “competitor” and “not a competitor”) do not sum to 444.
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even perhaps to the broader community as the quality 
of life is improved. It is therefore noteworthy that, for the 
most part, the interviewed organizations did not perceive 
substantial effects in either of these dimensions of 
potential community impact. Specifically:  
•	 No	higher	than	28	percent	of	organizations	in	any		
 subsample believed any change in their attendance  
 was due to the new project opening; that subsample  
 was the most closely linked to the project  
 (competitors in the same district). The full sample  
 result was only 12 percent believing the project  
 opening affected their attendance.
•	 While	40	percent	of	competitors	in	the	same	district		
 believed the project opening had an effect on new  
 businesses opening in the area (with 56 percent  
 believing more businesses opened), only 31 percent of  
 the much larger subsample of all organizations located  
 in the same district attributed business changes to  
 the project opening (although as many as 61 percent of 
 those organizations believed more businesses had  
 indeed opened in the area). Only 23 percent of the full  
 sample believed the project opening was the key cause  
 of new businesses in the area. 
•	 When	the	question	about	community	impact	is		
 posed in general terms, dramatically positive views  
 are expressed.  The question “Do you think the  
 project makes the city a more attractive place to live?”  
 generated a uniformly enthusiastic response, with the  
 full sample generating 88 percent positive responses,  
 and competitors within the same district reporting a 96  
 percent positive response. 
One set of results that was not anticipated was the 
degree to which opinions about the building projects 
differed prior to their completion in contrast to after 
they had opened. And once again, there were notable 
differences in the opinions of those organizations self-
identifying as competitors of the organization doing 
the building. There were also interesting differences in 
how those who were interviewed perceived the spillover 
effects on their own individual organizations compared to 
the broader cultural community. For example: 
•	 About	70	percent	of	all	organizations	anticipated	some		
 positive impact on the community, rising to 78 percent  
 after its opening. All other subsamples of organizations  
 were also enthusiastic about the project having some  
 positive impact on the broader community (at least 68  
 percent in all subsamples) with little or no measurable  
 change in that perception after the project was  
 completed. 
•	 The	projects	fared	best	in	their	ability	to	change		
 community perceptions when it came to two indices:  
 1) whether there was a “clear” need for the project,  
 and 2) whether the project would benefit only a few  
 people. In both cases, all surveyed subsamples notably  
 improved their perception of the expansion projects  
 after they opened, with the percentage of the full  
 sample believing the project was clearly needed (the  
 sum of those answering “yes” and “yes, and even more  
 so”) jumping from 45 percent to 64 percent, and the  
 percentage of the full sample believing the benefits  
 of the project were concentrated in only a few (the  
 sum of those answering “yes” and “yes, and even  
 more so”) dropping about 12 percentage points from  
 48 percent to 36 percent. These improvements were  
 generally replicated across all subsamples, with the  
 most dramatic increase in perceived “need” for the  
 project being exhibited by competitor organizations  
 not located in the same district (roughly doubling  
 from 29 percent to 57 percent). This small group again  
	 reflects	the	most	dramatic	improvement	in	perceived		
 “non-elitism” of the benefits of the project, with a drop  
 of 24 percentage points in those perceiving that the  
 project helps “only a few.” 
•	 The	projects	fared	less	well,	however,	in	generating		
 ex post confidence about their ability to spur economic  
 development. Anticipation about the potential for 
 economic development was uniformly high, with  
 roughly two-thirds of all subsamples answering “yes”  
 when asked: “Before the project was completed do  
 you think people in the community thought the new  
 project would help spur economic development in the 
 neighborhood?” Unfortunately, this enthusiasm 
 dropped notably across all subsamples after the  
 project opened, with the full sample answering “yes”  
 dropping by about 8 percentage points. The most  
 enthusiastic group (competitors within the same  
 district) experienced the biggest drop in confidence  
 about economic development, falling from 88 percent  
 “yes” to 72 percent “yes”. There is little doubt that some 
 of this drop in optimism about economic development  
	 reflects	concerns	about	current	overall	economic	
 conditions. except for particular negative comments 
	 about	individual	projects	reflecting	disappointment	
 in how those projects turned out (and there are indeed 
 some of those, although relatively rare), it is impossible 
 to isolate the relative importance of economy-wide 
 (including regional) versus project-specific factors 
 reliably in this decline in optimism regarding the ability 
 of projects to spur local economic development  
 (see also the discussion below on “Construction 
 Phase” effects). 
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The arts community and the broader nonprofit sector 
regularly discuss the relative merits of more cooperation 
versus more competition, and generally laud the merits 
of collaborative efforts. In fact, arts organizations in 
particular seem to be generally suspicious of the usual 
enthusiasm for rigorous competition that characterizes 
most of the rest of the economy, and it is likely that this 
sentiment is in part responsible for the reluctance of 
many organizations to identify themselves as competitors 
of the organizations doing the building in this survey. 
Among the most important results of the survey in this 
context is that perceived increases in the competitive 
climate within the cultural community are strongly linked 
to self-identified competitive and location status, but not 
clearly linked to optimism about overall tourism in the 
local community. This last effect was explored in as much 
as the perception of a more competitive climate following 
the building expansion would seem to be less likely where 
increased optimism existed regarding overall audience 
growth (in part due to enhanced tourism). When the 
overall “size of the pie” is expanding, fears about how that 
pie is being divided are generally less in evidence. 
The most important conclusions regarding the 
perceptions of the interviewed organizations regarding 
the competitive versus collaborative climate in the 
community following cultural building are:
•	 Organizations	self-identifying	as	competitors	of	the		
 expanding project organization are more than twice  
 as likely as “non-competitors” to believe that “the  
 impact of the project made cultural organizations  
 in [city or area] feel more competitive,” with almost  
 61 percent of competitors having that perception in  
 contrast to only about 24 percent of non-competitors.  
 Competitor organizations located in the same district  
 are especially likely to stress the enhanced competitive  
 climate (68 percent), with only 12 percent of that  
 group believing a sense of collaboration was enhanced  
 instead. 
•	 The	group	believing	most	strongly	that	the	project		
 enhanced a sense of collaboration among local cultural  
 organizations included those located in the same  
 district who did not believe they were competitors  
 of the project organization (about 38 percent), but  
 almost one-third of that group did not believe there  
 was any effect of the project on the competitive versus  
 collaborative climate (32 percent). Unsurprisingly, the  
 group most clearly perceiving the project to have no  
 such effect (almost 37 percent) consisted of those with  
 the least proximity (neither competitors nor in the  
 same district).
•	 While	an	increase	in	the	size	of	the	potential	audience		
 (e.g., if tourism to the area were increasing) would  
 potentially limit the perception of enhanced  
 competition among “threatened” competitors, there is 
 no clear link between a belief that the number of  
 tourists to the area had increased since the project  
 opened (not necessarily caused by the project)  
 and a perception that cultural organizations feel  
 more competitive as a result of the project. Despite  
 the dramatic difference in the competition/ 
 collaboration results between competitor and non- 
 competitor organizations (as reported in the first point  
 above), competitor respondents differed minimally  
 in the belief that tourism had increased (39 percent  
 versus 35 percent). Ironically, the group with the  
 highest percentage of organizations believing that  
 cultural organizations feel more competitive  
 (competitors in the same district, also had the most  
 optimistic view about increased tourism (52 percent  
 believed it had increased). Thus, there is no evidence  
 that community organizations link their views about  
 changes in tourism to their views about the effect of  
 the project on the competitive/collaborative climate.  
Because organizations who view themselves as 
competitors of the growing organization consistently 
have reported different reactions to such building than 
have self-identified non-competitors, it is useful to 
explore further just who is identifying as a competitor. 
Again, it must be emphasized that just because 
respondents failed to identify their organizations as being 
in competition with another organization does not prove 
that no competitive relationship exists. Many decades 
of antitrust merger investigations demonstrate that 
merging firms will often deny that they are competitors 
as part of their strategy to convince antitrust authorities 
that such a merger will be innocent of anti-competitive 
consequences. The motive in that case is strategic. The 
motive in the case of arts organizations may be their view 
of themselves as unique, or merely a natural tendency 
to emphasize the highly heterogeneous nature of the 
specific products and missions of largely nonprofit 
cultural organizations. 
In any case, it is useful to explore further the 
characteristics of the organizations’ self-proclaimed 
competitor status in the community survey, given 
the importance that such a status has played in the 
differing perceptions of positive or negative community 
impacts. Contrary to our expectations, the perception 
of competitive status with the expansion project is 
not always closely linked to the types of organizations 
involved. Location proximity seems to provide additional 
competitive interaction among “non-matching” 
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organizations, as one would expect should be the case. 
Other important results of the analysis of competitive 
status include: 
	•	Community	organizations	who	share	with	the		
 expansion project organization the same type, (e.g.  
 museum, theater, or performing arts center) are more  
 likely to define themselves as a competitor with the  
 expansion project organization. Of all self-identified  
 community competitor organizations, 76 percent  
 are “matching” with an expansion project. However,  
 this also means that 24 percent of the organizations  
 perceiving themselves as competitors with the  
 expansion organization are not closely matched. 
•	 Importantly,	those	competitor	organizations	located	
 in the same district are somewhat less likely to be close  
 matches, with only 68 percent of them being matches,  
 and 32 percent being “cross-type” competitors. This  
 is consistent with the reasonable assumption that  
 location proximity can generate competitive 
 interactions even across organizations that are not 
 providing directly similar cultural services. 
•	 Of	all	community	organizations	denying	that	they		
 have a competitive relationship with the expansion 
 project organization, as many as 51 percent are also 
 matches, suggesting that there is no strong relationship 
 between the type of organization and the perception 
 of competitive interaction among that subsample of 
 interviewed organizations. While not a notable 
 difference, a slightly higher percentage of “non-
 competitor” respondents who are located in the same 
 district as the expansion project (56 percent compared 
 to 51 percent of all non-competitor organizations) 
 are cultural “matches,” which is inconsistent with 
 expectations and inconsistent with the results observed 
 for the “competitor” subsamples. 
EcONOMIc  IMPAcTS  Of  
THE  cONSTRUcTION PHASE
Frequently, supporters of building expansion projects 
will focus on the construction phases themselves when 
seeking to highlight positive broader community impacts. 
While inherently short term, and not likely to outweigh 
longer-term consequences regarding the ongoing 
operations of the expanding organization and other 
community groups that may be affected, this focus is 
linked closely to “economic impact analysis,” as that term 
is generally understood. This section closes with a brief 
description of a key element of such studies. 
Because the likelihood of an expansion project generating 
traditional spending impacts on the local economy 
depends in part on the source of funding for the 
construction of such projects, it is important to identify 
those funding sources. Of the various types of such 
funding, the following are especially likely to represent an 
“injection” of non-local money and economic activity into 
the local economy where the project is located:
	 ✔	Foundation grants
 ✔ Corporate contributions
 ✔ State government funds
 ✔ Federal government funds
 ✔ Large individual gifts
 ✔ endowment funds
While these categories of funding can have complex non-
local versus local attributes, the following core results 
are obtained using this definition of “non-local funding.” 
These results suggest that at least modestly positive 
short-term spending impacts would likely accompany 
the construction phases of these cultural infrastructure 
building projects, although source of funding is only one 
key element to be investigated by a thorough economic 
impact study. For example, factors such as low local 
“capture” rates of first-round spending—due in part to 
the use of non-local subcontractors, the repatriation of 
profits to non-local architects and other specialized labor, 
and other initial high spending “leakages”—as well as 
potentially relatively low later round multiplier effects in 
less economic self-sufficient regions, would be critically 
important determinants as well. 
 1. The average percentage of non-local funds across  
  the sample of focal 56 projects is 60 percent.
 2. The median percentage of non-local funds across  
  the sample of focal 56 projects is 68 percent.
 3. Four projects were exclusively funded with non- 
  local sources.
 4. Two projects were exclusively funded from  
  local sources. 
Sufficient data were available regarding the construction 
funding sources for nine of the 13 MSAs that were 
analyzed in the community survey. The data revealed an 
average percentage of non-local funding of 60 percent, 
ranging from lows of 27 percent and 28 percent to a 
high of 100 percent, with two additional cities having 
greater than 80 percent of non-local funding (84 percent 
and 90 percent), based on the definition of non-local 
funding described above. Interestingly, the only two 
findings of a statistically significant relationship between 
the percentage of non-local funding and any of the 
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community survey measures of community impact 
suggested that more external funding had positive 
community effects. The higher the percentage of non-
local funding (and hence potentially the local economic 
impact of the building projects in the MSA), the more 
muted the local concern that at least the target building 
project had led to more competition among arts 
organizations. And there was also a modestly statistically 
significant negative relationship between the percentage 
of non-local construction funding and the percentage 
of community organizations reporting that they suffered 
a reduction in fundraising following the opening of  
the targeted project. This is hardly a robust finding, 
but it is suggestive of the possibility that greater local 
construction spending impacts that generally accompany 
the injection of new spending into a community can mute 
the extent to which non-building organizations suffer 
financial fallout from the added attention focused on 
the expanding organization. 
The extensive community survey of non-building 
organizations failed to reveal dramatic spillover effects 
of specific cultural building projects on non-building 
local organizations, despite press reports of particular 
examples of largely negative consequences in selected 
cases.
Yet, even among the committed and informed arts 
personnel interviewed in the community survey—
who might be expected to be inherently enthusiastic 
about the expansion and increased visibility of the 
arts in their regions—only about 64 percent viewed 
the target building project as having favorable overall 
community effects, and those organizations that 
perceived themselves to be competitors of the expanding 
organization were significantly less enthusiastic. That 
enthusiasts of cultural building might easily overstate 
the degree of community support for their efforts is a 
potential warning sign, based on the level of skepticism 
within this group about the ability of such cultural 
building projects to stimulate community economic 
development and dramatically raise the favorable 
profile of the arts in their community. However, the fact 
that even the less enthusiastic local competitors have 
difficulty identifying specific negative consequences of 
the building project on attendance, fundraising, artistic 
programming, or hiring of talented employees, further 
suggests that the occasional worst-case scenario press 
reports	are	indeed	not	reflective	of	the	broader	reality.	
exploring the perceptions of local arts executives about 
the broader consequences of particular high-profile 
building projects has the advantage of attempting to 
establish causal relationships that can be very hard to 
establish solely via statistical analysis of attendance 
or revenue patterns, which of course might also be 
influenced	by	many	other	factors	beyond	the	targeted	
building project. Yet perceptions can be faulty and 
inconsistent. The relatively few organizations that viewed 
themselves as competitors of the expanding organization 
may well be indicative of a failure to fully grasp the extent 
to which these local cultural organizations are truly 
interdependent. 
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fter gathering and analyzing data from every 
corner, trying to learn more about how  
decision making occurs throughout the process 
of planning and building and by whom, and looking  
for larger-scale trends and patterns, as well as 
consequences, what exactly did we learn? We found that 
there was, indeed, a very substantial increase in the scale 
of cultural facilities building during the 15-year period 
from 1994 to 2008, and especially between 1998 and 
2001. The increase was not only in the number of facilities 
that were built but also for the total aggregate cost of 
all building. And the data suggest that the average cost 
of individual structures increased as well. Building in the 
arts was also growing at a rate that was faster or at least 
equal to other sectors. This building boom took place 
throughout the country, but was concentrated in certain 
areas, particularly the South, which saw an enormous 
increase in the total number of facilities. And it was not 
only larger cities that were investing in building, but also 
smaller cities located in areas typically not thought to be 
capable of supporting sizeable cultural institutions. Our 
data suggest that many of these cities were building for 
the first time. We now know precisely what was built, and 
we know that PACs were by far the dominant form of 
new facility.
In terms of the determinants we found for investment in 
cultural building in cities throughout the United States 
there were a few common elements: the number of 
cultural facilities a city already had, the rate of growth in 
the population over the prior decades, the average level 
of education and median household income. But there 
was also a striking heterogeneity among the cities that 
built. There were many variations based primarily on 
the nature of the region and the size of the city. What 
surprised us was how difficult it was to get a generalized 
picture of these determinants. Part of this is due in part 
to a serious lack of reliable, detailed data on cities in the 
United States (this is the case even in larger cities). In our 
case, it presented challenges to our goal of executing an 
analysis both broad in scope and detailed in terms of the 
individual building projects. Given our experience, a push 
to increase the quantity, quality, and consistency of  
data gathered for urban areas in the future should be a 
high priority. 
We found compelling evidence that the supply of 
cultural facilities exceeded demand during the years of 
the building boom. We made efforts to measure what 
actually constitutes demand for cultural facilities—for 
example, the number of artists and arts organizations in a 
given region. Then, controlling for other factors, we found 
that the relationship between supply and what we called 
demand were not exactly what our theories predicted. 
Significantly more research is needed to get to the heart 
of not only what actually comprises demand for facilities, 
but also how supply and demand varies over time. What 
our research has enabled us to conclude, however, is that 
there was significant overinvestment in bricks and mortar 
during the building boom—especially when coupled with 
the number of organizations we studied that experienced 
financial difficulties after completing a building project. 
Turning to the issue of the feasibility (or advisability) 
of building, our goal was to identify characteristics of 
projects that helped to ensure their success. This, in turn, 
can provide practitioners—those out in the field working 
as trustees, executive directors, consultants, architects, 
city planners, and so on—with the kind of information 
that can help them develop and refine effective practices 
for planning a facility, for constructing it, and then for 
managing it effectively once it is completed. From 
observing a sample of projects, we have learned what 
elements appeared to be important to securing the 
success of projects, but whether or not these elements 
are common to all projects is still an issue that needs 
more research. The facilities we looked at in our study 
were, to some extent, moving targets. Some were 
launched very successfully; many experienced rough 
starts and had continuing problems; and some had 
problems that started well back in the planning and 
construction phase. Others had a brief uptick and then 
settled into slightly (or sometimes extremely) negative 
financial territory. And some gradually stabilized after 
the first four to five years. 
What is clear, however, is that there is no “one-size-
fits-all” profile that can accurately serve as an indicator 
(or set of indicators) of success or failure. The outcome 
of these projects appears to be linked to very specific 
characteristics of the community and the location. In 
other words, each project was to a significant degree 
distinct in terms of the situation and circumstances in 
which it was being launched. Situations such as having 
a core group of trustees that was financially, civically, 
and politically aligned in support of a complex building 
project; or perhaps having a mayor and/or city council 
who were determined to do everything possible to 
ensure the long-term success of a capital project, 
whatever their specific motivations might be—things like 
these	often	influenced	whether	the	project	succeeded	or	
floundered,	both	in	the	short-	and	the	longer	term.
Our case studies further confirmed the idiosyncratic 
nature of cultural building projects. Using our case 
studies (not including the additional site visits and 
interviews we did on other projects), we were able to 
see in detail not only how different each project was 
cONcLUSION
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in terms of the external factors that impacted project 
trajectories, but also the extent to which organizational 
goals varied from project to project, and sometimes 
evolved substantially as they moved from inception 
through to completion. From deciding on the size of 
the new facility, to when to start building, to taking the 
sometimes enormous financial risk—having both clarity 
and consensus about the organization’s goals and its 
mission are vital to how managers strategically design 
each project. Because these case studies are intended 
to be pedagogical tools that will begin to change 
normative practice, we have also learned how to  
think effectively about the strategic design of projects 
in the future.  
Another goal of the study was to provide a substantial 
body of data on cultural building for researchers who 
want to study related topics. And that is what we have 
gathered and organized, including more than 500 
interviews. As we conclude our study, we outline what, 
given our findings, we believe are some important 
future paths of research. There needs to be more 
fine-grained investigation into the population of all 
cultural building projects in order to better understand 
the built landscape. This would involve, among other 
things, continuing to track these projects once they are 
launched, determining how many are actually completed, 
and noting how many succeed and how many fail, and 
how many morph into something altogether different. 
More research is also needed to get at what proportion 
of these projects receive significant public support 
and what proportion depend exclusively on private, 
foundation, and corporate philanthropy. 
In addition to these projects having implications for the 
organizations that pursue them, they also have large 
policy implications stemming from their interactions in 
the public sphere. As mentioned above, more research 
is needed in order to get a clearer picture of what 
constitutes demand for cultural facilities. The literature 
in cultural economics already includes what comprises 
demand for arts participation of one kind or another, 
but demand likely differs for the various cultural facilities 
themselves. It includes some of the elements that 
comprise demand for arts participation, but also involves 
other factors such as the demographic and economic 
characteristics of the communities that these facilities 
inhabit and purport to serve. In addition, competing 
and evolving ways of consuming the arts (i.e., television 
broadcasts of live performances, HD transmissions 
of performing arts events to movie theaters, online 
resources) necessarily come into play. Achieving a 
greater understanding of the relationship between 
supply and demand for cultural facilities is, we believe, 
vital to securing the long-term sustainability of cultural 
organizations in the future. 
And, in regard to research on the actual management 
and oversight of both the planning and the actual 
construction of these facilities, there is ample 
opportunity for researchers to continue to identify 
additional best practices. Our research points to what 
worked and what did not work during projects launched 
in the past, and raises issues about what project leaders 
might watch for in the future. But in order to conclusively 
verify best practices going forward, more investigation 
is needed. Some of this research would, ideally, involve 
doing additional detailed case studies. 
This study comprises a major step forward in refining our 
knowledge of the practice of cultural building, but more 
remains to be done. When we launched this project, 
almost five years ago, we did not realize how complex 
and intricate these projects were—from an economic 
and philanthropic angle, and from an organizational and 
governance point of view. There is still much left to do. 
As a result of our findings, we have also developed 
additional dissemination vehicles designed to impact 
the cultural sector and the practitioners who work in it. 
Two books about cultural building are under contract 
with the University of Chicago Press—one about the 
strategic management of these projects, and the 
other about the broader impacts these projects have 
on the nation's cultural ecology. In addition to these 
two forthcoming volumes, we have developed other 
dissemination vehicles targeted at helping to change 
normative practice, and particularly to alert those 
embarked on similar large-scale building projects for 
their organization(s) about what has worked well in 
the past, and what to avoid. Our immediate goal is to 
communicate the results and conclusions from this study 
to the executive directors, managers, board members, 
philanthropists, wealth management advisors, arts 
service organization, mayors and city council members, 
involved in these complex undertakings. As a result, we 
hope	to	influence	the	decision-making	that	goes	into	
cultural buildings projects in order to produce better, 
more	flexible,	and	sustainable	structures	for	future	
generations. The broad, empirical nature of our research 
will, if we are fortunate, assist those in charge 
of designing and building the next generation of 
museums, theaters and performing arts centers 
throughout the United States.
In conclusion, our goal for this study and the additional 
dissemination products is to ensure that all who are 
involved in major cultural building projects in the future 
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will at least know of (and hopefully consult and study) 
the	research	we	have	produced.	If	we	can	influence	these	
people to make more informed decisions about if, when, 
and how to build sustainable cultural facilities that serve 
both the artists and the communities they perform for, 
then we have accomplished what we set out to do. 
APPENDIx  I : 
ST UDY  METHODOLOgY
efore we started this study, we had proposed 
a methodology that was comprised of three 
main phases in order to answer each one of our 
research questions. The first question was, “What kind 
of building has been going on in the cultural sector?” 
We planned to respond first by creating a census and 
taxonomy of building projects in the past decade; and 
then by choosing a sample of up to 50 projects for 
more detailed examination. We chose 50 as the sample 
size since we thought it would allow us to understand 
the idiosyncrasies of each project as well as to conduct 
a quantitative analysis that could generate statistical 
significance for strong empirical regularities. Out of those 
50 projects, we wanted at least 30 to be large projects 
that would presumably have strong effects on the 
organizations that pursued them and the communities in 
which they lived, and at most 20 that were either small 
projects without substantial impacts, or communities 
without a project at all. The latter group was meant to 
serve as a control group for the quantitative analysis 
we initially meant to perform. The second question we 
wanted to answer was, “How are building decisions 
made?” This phase of the study involved producing both 
descriptive and normative analyses based on the set of 
50 projects sampled from the database constructed in 
Phase I, and then selecting a set of cases to be explored 
in more detail using interviews and site visits. The last 
question we wanted to answer was, “What has the impact 
been?” Using the set of 50 cases sampled, we planned to 
conduct a multivariate data analysis informed by current 
literature in cultural economics in order to look closely 
at the impact that these building projects had on the 
organizations that launched them and the longer term 
“spillover effects” on the surrounding cultural sector in a 
given city or district. 
As with any major research project, once we started the 
study, we recognized that there were challenges to the 
methodology we initially proposed, and in some instances 
more effective ways to answer our research questions. 
In the end, we used a similar but slightly modified 
methodology that still included all the component 
parts, but arranged them in a slightly different manner. 
Specifically, we separated the research into four parts: 
assembling and analyzing a census of all building projects 
meeting a broad set of criteria in order to study the 
landscape of cultural infrastructure (Part One); choosing 
a random sample of 50 projects for in-depth study 
to identify the direct impacts of building on cultural 
organizations, and conducting a multivariate analysis of 
the relationship between how much a city invests and its 
economic and demographic characteristics in order 
to look into how building decisions are made (Part Two); 
sampling and interviewing organizations located near 
projects to identify the indirect impacts of building (Part 
Three); and conducting case studies to examine the 
strategic management decisions behind building projects 
(Part Four). 
The main differences between the methodology we 
initially proposed and the one we used include the 
following. Instead of organizing the study by sequential 
phases, we organized it by simultaneous parts. We found 
this method to be more efficient since each part could be 
going on concurrently rather than having to wait until one 
part was completely finished in order to start another. 
Particularly in regard to conducting the surveys, we found 
that the time to implement various pieces of the project 
took longer than anticipated, and therefore, starting the 
next part of the study while one was not already finished 
helped us to complete the study on time. 
While initially we had planned to conduct a multivariate 
analysis on the sample of 50 projects to see what their 
impact had been on the organizations that pursued 
them, we instead conducted a descriptive analysis of 
the projects using quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Throughout the course of conducting our research, we 
realized that a sample of 50 projects was still not large 
enough to produce statistically significant results with 
a multivariate analysis, nor were the financial data we 
were able to obtain for each project rich enough to do an 
analysis of this kind. Since we only had access to public 
data from organizations’ IRS 990 forms—data that are 
both inconsistent between observations and/or missing—
we were limited with respect to producing statistically 
robust findings. Furthermore, our attempts at obtaining 
detailed and accurate financial data from individual 
organizations proved to be much more difficult than we 
had initially anticipated. While our survey respondents 
were certainly cooperative in regards to answering 
questions about their building project, they found it 
harder to come up with detailed financial data about the 
project or their organization. 
Instead of creating a control group as part of the sample 
of 50, we opted to collect data on all large projects. 
B
cultural Policy center at the University of chicago SeT IN STONe   36
This was because the dataset we acquired of all cultural 
building projects proved to us that the majority of all 
cultural building projects were actually large ones (less 
than 7 percent of all projects cost less than $4 million), 
thus we were limited in regards to the number of projects 
we had to choose from, and because we realized that 
analyzing so few projects would make it difficult for us 
to come to any statistically relevant conclusions about 
cultural building. 
We also added another piece to the research study 
that was not initially proposed but that offers insight 
into the question of how building decisions are made. 
This included examining the relationship between how 
much a city builds, and other city-level economic and 
demographic variables, in order to determine what the 
investment determinants of cultural building might be. 
In order to assemble the census of projects in the 
United States, we obtained data on building permits 
of all cultural construction projects (new construction, 
renovations, and additions) that were issued between 
1994 and 2008. We used data between 1994 and 2008 
because these are the years for which data were available 
from McGraw-Hill Construction, Inc. The building permit 
data include information on the cost of construction, 
square footage, location (MSA), and ownership of 
projects. We only included projects that cost over $4 
million in 2005 dollars. We included museums, theaters, 
and PACs. Museums include traditional art museums, 
ethnic museums, history museums and historical societies 
and organizations, and cultural art centers that focused 
primarily on exhibiting art. We did not include children’s 
museums, science museums, natural history museums, 
halls of fame, and specialty museums including museums 
devoted to the study and/or display of one object (i.e., 
Balloon Museum), one industry (i.e., Police Museum), or 
a person (i.e., ernest Hemingway Museum) since we felt 
that the nature of these museums’ missions differed from 
those of the museums we did include (those that tended 
to be more focused on cultural enjoyment as opposed 
to the pursuit of knowledge and/or scientific inquiry). 
Theaters included single-use performance spaces such 
as those concentrating on hosting Broadway tours or 
those with their own resident companies. PACs included 
spaces that host multi-disciplinary performance acts (i.e., 
comedians, pop concerts, dance groups, theater groups), 
cultural art centers primarily focused on performance, 
dance theaters, opera houses, symphony halls, concert 
halls, and auditoriums. We included university-owned 
institutions, but not those owned by high schools, middle 
schools, and elementary schools. 
From the population, we sampled 56 organizations that 
started building projects between 1999 and 2003. Our 
initial goal was 50 projects, but in the end we sampled 
more projects than intended because some organizations 
took a long time responding to us during the recruitment 
phase of the survey and we wanted to be sure to get at 
least 50. We wanted projects to be recent enough that 
project representatives could still remember and speak to 
the process of planning and building, but also far enough 
removed that we could observe post-project opening 
operations. Because of the limited availability of projects, 
the sample ended up including projects that opened 
between 1998 and 2007. We extended the range of 
opening dates upwards (rather than downwards) because 
we believed it would be too difficult to recall specifics 
about projects that took place before 1998. In order 
to draw conclusions about the population of building 
projects, we needed the sample to be representative of 
the population launched during this window, and thus we 
employed a stratified probability sampling method. The 
process of picking a random sample of 56 focal projects 
for in-depth analysis was done in several steps. First, we 
cleaned the data in order to filter out types of projects 
that did not fit the study criteria. Next, we stratified the 
projects based on a number of criteria including the 
size of the MSA, the cost of the project, the number of 
projects in each MSA, and the type of project. Table A 
defines the strata. 
All in all, the sample distribution compares quite well with 
the distribution of projects in the population. The biggest 
differences lie in the percentage of small MSAs that had 
only one project (17.9 percent in the sample versus 43.1 
percent in the population) and the percentage of large 
MSAs that had five or more projects (37.5 percent in the 
sample versus 11.6 percent in the population). Also, the 
average cost of projects (over $10 million in small MSAs 
TABLE  I .A . 
Stratification Design.
STRATUM
Size of MSA
Cost of Project
Number of Projects in MSA 
Type of Project
cRITE RIA
Small MSA: Population under 2 million
Large MSA:  Population over 2 million
Small MSA: Projects valued over $10 million
Large MSA: Projects valued over $25 million
Small MSA: 1, 2, 3 or more projects
Large MSA: 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more projects
Museums, Theaters, Performing Arts Centers
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and $25 million in large MSAs) was higher in the sample 
for small MSAs and lower in the sample for large MSAs.
After we chose the sample, we interviewed the 
executive directors of the project’s organization using 
a structured questionnaire that covered the planning 
process, funding, and usability of building projects, 
as well as the governance structure and future plans 
of the organization. Respondents also filled out an 
extensive worksheet that provided financial operating 
data and information about their governing boards. As 
discussed previously, the financial data we obtained 
from the worksheets did not prove to be as fruitful as we 
anticipated. We also collected financial information from 
IRS 990 forms for the focal 56 projects for at least five 
years before and after the project opening date. Finally, 
we used LexisNexis and Google to get contemporary 
press reports regarding the planning and execution of 
the project and what had happened to the institution 
since the completion of the project. Table C details the 
response rate from the survey we conducted of the 
managers of building projects.
The part of the study we added, which we did not 
initially anticipate doing, was conducting a multivariate 
analysis of the relationship between how much a 
city invests in cultural building and its economic and 
demographic characteristics. To do this, we assembled 
a dataset consisting of 287 MSAs and economic and 
demographic variables for each MSA for the years 
1994 to 2008. We used the data we obtained from 
McGraw-Hill Construction, Inc. to measure the amount 
each MSA invested in cultural building in each year, 
and a variety of public sources including the Census 
County Business Patterns data, Decennial Census and 
American Community Survey (ACS) data, and data from 
the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), to 
measure economic and demographic characteristics for 
each city. Here we included all projects whether or not 
they were above the threshold of $4 million, thus even 
small MSAs that had small projects were included in the 
analysis.
Part Three of the study included choosing a focal project 
in 13 cities across the United States and sampling and 
interviewing organizations that may have been indirectly 
TABLE  I .B . 
Sample and Population Comparison.
TABLE  I .c .
Manager's Survey Response Rate. The response rate of the survey was 62.2 percent.
Notes: The response rate was calculated by the formula (I+P)/(I+P) + (R+NC+O), which uses partial interviews as respondents. This is response rate 2 on the 
American Association of Public Opinion Research Response Rate calculator; R includes situations where contact was made, there was an agreement to par-
ticipate, and a worksheet was in progress, as well as situations where contact was made and there was a final refusal; O includes situations where contact was 
made but there was no agreement, and situations where a case was replaced due to a lack of cooperation.
STRATUM
Type
Museums
Theaters
PACs
Size of MSA
Small
Large
cost of Projects
Small MSA
Large MSA
Number of Projects
Small 1 Project
Small 2 Projects
Small 3 Projects
Large 1-2 Projects
Large 3-4 Projects
Large 5 or more Projects
SAMPLE
Proportion of Projects
33.9%
16.1%
50.0%
58.9%
41.1%
Average
$49,600,000
$55,600,000
Proportion of MSAs
17.9%
16.1%
25%
0%
1.8%
37.5%
POPULATION
Proportion of Projects
38.8%
11.0%
50.2%
45.4%
47.3%
Average
$28,050,000
$71,223,330
Proportion of MSAs
43.1%
20.4%
23.2%
0%
1.7%
11.6%
I =  cOMPL ETE
INTERvIE wS
52
P = PAR TIAL 
INTERvIEwS
4
R=RE fUSA L  A N D 
BRE A k-Off
1 3
N c=
N ON  cON TAcT
1
O=
OTHE R
20
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impacted by the focal project. As part of the 13 cities, 
we chose five focal projects (MSAs) from the set of 50 
projects sampled in Part Two, and eight projects (MSAs) 
for which we conducted interviews to produce the case 
studies in Part Four. We then developed an exhaustive 
list of arts organizations in each city using the data in 
NCCS and interviewed the director of each organization 
that we were able to recruit on issues related to how 
they felt their organization was impacted by the focal 
project. Altogether, we ended up interviewing 444 
organizations in the 13 cities in our community survey. 
Drawing on the census, we chose a group of 
organizations for in-depth qualitative case studies. Our 
selection grid had two criteria: city size and building 
purpose. Two city sizes (population under two million 
and population over two million) and three types of 
building use (single use performance venues, multi-use 
performance venues, and museums) were considered. 
This produced six categories of projects, and we chose 
at least one project in each category for fieldwork. The 
projects we selected also represented a diverse set 
of regions of the country as well as governance and 
leadership profiles. All of them involved projects within 
the visual or performing arts that cost over $25 million to 
complete. To ensure that the people interviewed could 
remember important details, only projects that opened 
(or would have opened) in 2006 or later were studied. All 
in all, 11 projects were subjects of in-depth field study, and 
of these, we wrote up four detailed case studies.
Three of the case studies were based on field research. 
Altogether, we conducted 78 interviews about these 
projects with current and former executive staff, trustees, 
public officials, and artistic and community leaders for a 
kaleidoscopic view of the decision-making considerations 
and challenges of each project. We wanted our work to 
cover a range of possible outcomes, and since subject 
collaboration in a research effort like this seems tied to 
project success, we also looked through the public record 
for additional case study candidates. We created a fourth 
case, about the Taubman Museum in Virginia, on the basis 
of news coverage and financial reports. Of the four cases, 
two cover performing arts buildings, and two discuss new 
construction carried out by museums.
As a result of this study, we now have four very large 
and informative datasets on cultural building. The first 
is the census and taxonomy of all building projects that 
were started between 1994 and 2008; the second is the 
data we collected in the manager’s survey on the sample 
of 56 projects, including all of their IRS 990 form 
financial information; the third is the dataset of 287 MSAs 
with demographic and economic variables for the years  
1994 through 2008; and the fourth and final is the data 
we collected of 444 organizations as part of our 
community survey. Most of these datasets will be 
available by permission to researchers who wish to use 
them in future studies. 
TA BL E  I .D. 
Case Study Grid.
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APPENDIx  I I : 
MA N AgER’S  S URvEY MATERIAL S
DATe
Dear______,
We are writing to invite you to participate in a major study of America’s cultural infra-
structure. Sponsored by the Mellon, MacArthur and Kresge foundations, a research team 
led by investigators at the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chi-
cago (NORC) is examining the recent building boom that altered the country’s cultural 
landscape. This study will focus on both new cultural facilities and renovations that were 
begun between 1999 and 2003. We have created a comprehensive inventory of cultural 
infrastructure projects in the United States and chosen fifty projects on which to more 
intensively focus. You have detailed knowledge about one of these projects, the [project 
name].
We would like to talk to you about the planning and execution of this project and its 
impact after completion. The interview will consist of a survey one hour in length and 
the information you provide us with will be kept confidential. The results of this study 
will help others who are planning similar projects. While your participation in this survey 
is voluntary, your help is critical to its success. We have the support of these three lead-
ing foundations because they think that this study will have a significant impact on the 
cultural sector in years to come.
The Survey Lab at the University of Chicago will be contacting you between [specified 
dates] to schedule an interview and we will send you a worksheet prior to it to help you 
recollect information needed for the survey. Should you have any questions, please con-
tact Joanna Woronkowicz at (773) 256-6028 or Woronkowicz-Joanna@norc.uchicago.
edu. If you are not the person most familiar with the planning and execution of [project 
name] please let us know so we can contact the person who is most familiar with the 
project.
This study is the first such examination done on the broader cultural infrastructure in 
the United States, and it promises to be a very valuable resource for years to come. The 
insights you provide us with about your experiences and involvement through participa-
tion in the survey will be crucial to its success.
Sincerely yours,
D Carroll Joynes
executive Director  
f IgURE  I I .1 . 
Advance Letter
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Pro je c t  I n fo r mat ion  S h eet  cu l tu ra l  I n f ras t ruc tu re
what is this study about? The cultural sector in the United States, primarily performing arts centers, theaters and 
museums, has experienced a recent building boom. Some of these buildings are expansions and renovations, and some 
are entirely new facilities. Some of these projects may increase audience, increase earned and donated income, and 
help realize an institution’s mission. Conversely, large building projects may saddle arts organizations with debt that 
cuts into their ability to deliver core programming. The Cultural Policy Center at the University of Chicago has launched 
a research initiative to explore recent building projects and their consequences in a systematic way. The object of 
the research is to draw on the real experiences of a wide variety of arts groups in order to develop guidelines 
about how arts organizations might best approach facilities renovation and building projects to meet their needs. 
An important piece of this project involves speaking with people at cultural institutions with recently completed 
building projects in 50 different cities across the United States.
who is conducting this research? D. Carroll Joynes and Norman M. Bradburn of the National Opinion Research Center 
at the University of Chicago are directing the study. Peter Frumkin of the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community 
Service, Robert H. Gertner of the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago, and Bruce Seaman of the An-
drew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University are the principal investigators who will be analyzing 
the data. The University of Chicago Survey Lab is carrying out the phone interviews. The study is being funded by the 
Mellon Foundation, Kresge Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation.
why should you participate? Although your participation is completely voluntary, it is critical to the success of this 
project. Only you can report about the decision-making process behind your organization’s recent building or  
renovation project. we will share the report from this project with you. We will also collaborate with National Arts 
Strategies to develop a curriculum designed to provide concrete tools to help arts executives apply our research  
findings to their own institutions.
what can you expect from completing a phone survey? Once you have agreed to participate, we will send an  
information form to collect some basic information beforehand. Then we will ask you to speak to us in an open-ended 
way for about an hour at a time most convenient to you. We will ask to tape the interview as this makes it faster and 
more accurately captures your thoughts. Questions will focus on a building or renovation project completed several 
years ago by your organization. We will ask some basic information about your organization now (audience size or 
visitor counts, seating capacity or gallery space, etc.) and then focus on the process through which your organization 
initiated, funded and carried out the project.
who will know what you say? The interviewer you speak with will know what you say. However, all our interviewers are 
trained to maintain the confidentiality of our survey respondents. we will not identify any participants or  
organizations by name. We will report summary results only. We may group responses by region of the country or 
broad size categories to make the results more meaningful.
who if you have questions or concerns? Your rights as a participant in survey research are protected by the  
University of Chicago’s institutional review board (IRB) and if you ever think your rights have been violated you are 
encouraged to contact Social and Behavioral Sciences IRB at (773) 834-7835, 5835 S. Kimbark Ave. Chicago IL 60637. 
If you have questions about the research itself or want to schedule an interview time, please call Survey Lab Director, 
Martha Van Haitsma, at 773-834-3674 or call us on our toll-free number at 1-866-523-4435. 
f IgURE  I I . 2 
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DATe
Dear ,
Recently we called you about a study of cultural organization building projects. You were not interested in participat-
ing. Nobody will call you again about this research project, but …
Please reconsider!
•	We	appreciate	that	your	time	is	valuable.	We	can	schedule	our	interview	in	short	segments	by	phone.
•	A	high	response	rate	is	needed	to	make	sure	that	the	experiences	and	opinions	of	all	organizational	types	and	all	
parts of the country are properly represented.
•	Because	your	organization	was	selected	through	a	scientific	sampling	process,	we	cannot	substitute	anybody	for	
you.
•	You	can	choose	to	skip	any	question	you	don’t	wish	to	answer	and	end	the	interview	at	any	time.
•	Your	answers	are	confidential	and	not	linked	to	your	identity.
•	You	can	schedule	an	interview	at	a	time	that	is	convenient	for	you,	daytime	or	evening,	weekday	or	weekend.
We depend on the generous cooperation of arts organization leaders such as you to make sure that policy makers and 
arts funders have the data they need to make informed decisions.
Please call our toll-free number 1-866-523-4435 and set up a time for an interview. We appreciate your serious con-
sideration of this request. You may also call me on my direct line provided below my signature. Thank you for your 
assistance.
Sincerely,
Martha Van Haitsma, Director
University of Chicago Survey Lab
(773) 834-3674
mvh@uchicago.edu 
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f IgURE  I I .4 . 
Appointment Confirmation Letter
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f IgURE  I I . 5 . 
Respondent Worksheet
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f IgURE  I I . 5 . 
Respondent Worksheet (continued)
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Respondent Worksheet (continued)
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f IgURE  I I . 6 . 
Phone Follow-Up Recruitment Script
For proxy:  Hello, this is _________ calling from the University of Chicago for [R NAMe]. Is {he/she} available?
If Not – When would be a better time to call back?
Can you put me into a voicemail box for him/her?
Voicemail: Hello, this is __________ calling from the University of Chicago. We recently sent you a letter about re-
search looking at building projects carried out by arts organizations. Your organization was selected to represent arts 
organizations of similar size and type across the country. I am calling to make sure you received the materials we sent 
and to answer any questions.  You may call me back at ###-###-#### or I will try to reach you another time. Major 
arts funders such as Kresge Foundation, Mellon Foundation and MacArthur Foundation are sponsoring this research in 
order to develop useful advice for arts organizations who are planning renovations, additions or new building projects. 
We will share results with participants.  We very much hope you will be a part of this effort.
IF R IS ON THe PHONe:
Hello, this is _________ calling from the University of Chicago. I am following up on a mailing you should have received 
from us concerning arts organization building projects. Did you get our letter?
Yes ➔ Do you have questions?
No ➔ I’m sorry, let me confirm your mailing address. I can also send you materials by email if you prefer (collect email 
address)
Do you have a minute for me to tell you about the project or is there a better time for me to call back?
Better time ➔ Schedule it
OK now ➔ The cultural sector in the United States, primarily performing arts centers, theaters and museums, has 
experienced a recent building boom. Projects include renovations, expansions and new construction.  The Cultural 
Policy Center at the University of Chicago has launched a research initiative to explore recent building projects and 
their consequences in a systematic way. The object of the research is to draw on the real experiences of a wide variety 
of arts groups in order to develop guidelines about how arts organizations might best approach facilities renovation 
and building projects to meet their needs. An important piece of this project involves speaking with people at cultural 
institutions with recently completed building projects in 50 different cities across the United States. Your organization 
has been chosen to represent other groups of similar size in similarly sized locations across the country. Although
your participation in the study is completely voluntary, we depend on cooperation from arts leaders such as you for 
the success of this project.
If you are willing to speak with us, we would like to mail ahead a some factual questions about the recent large building 
project at your organization so that you can look up numbers such as total square footage or seating capacity.  After 
we collect that information, we would like to speak to you in a more open-ended way by phone to learn about the 
process your group went through in order to plan, pay for and carry out your building project. We expect this will take 
about an hour.  We can schedule a time to talk at your convenience – daytime or evening, weekday or weekend. The re-
sults of this study will be presented in a summary way and will not identify individual people or organizations. We will 
share the results with study participants.
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f IgURE  I I .7. 
Verbal Consent Script
Before we begin I want to make sure you understand the nature of this research and that we have your permission to 
proceed.  We want to talk to you about the planning and implementation of a recent new facility, renovation or addi-
tion project completed by your cultural organization. everything you tell us is confidential. Reports from the project 
will present things in summary form and not connect them with individual people or organizations.  Your participation 
is voluntary: you may decline to answer any question and end the interview at any time. The project information sheet 
we sent to you has our contact information as well as contact information for the institutional review board, the group 
that protects the rights of people who participate in research. If you are concerned about the way we are conducting 
this research you may contact them. ] If you no longer have the project information sheet and would like to contact 
them I can give you their phone now –
[IF R DID NOT KeeP THe SHeeT GIVe IRB PHONe HeRe] (773) 834-7835]
I would like your permission to tape the interview for completeness and accuracy. We erase tapes at the end of the 
project. Is it OK to tape?
 [YeS- OKAY TO TAPe] Thank you. Remember that you can ask us to turn off the tape at any time.
 [NO – HAND-WRITTeN NOTeS ONLY] That’s fine.
[ONLY IF THIS IS ALSO A TRAINING INTeRVIeW ADD]. I would also like permission to include some graduate student 
observers in this interview. As part of our training at the Survey Lab, we like to include students who can [practice their 
note-taking/ observe me, the interviewer, and take notes about my technique].  Is it OK to include ______ student 
[observer(s)/note-taker(s)] as part of this interview?
 [YeS] Thank you.
 [NO] ASK ANY STUDeNTS PReSeNT TO LeAVe THe ROOM.
Do you have any questions about the interview before we begin? ANSWeR ANY QUeSTIONS. 
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DATE ____________________________  cASEID ______       
       INTERvIEwER ID ___________
**At the time the interview is being scheduled, the caller doing the scheduling should confirm/clarify the following 
things. write down the answers!
**A1. Does this arts facility include … [check all that apply]
  1 Stages or performance space
  2 An arts museum of any kind
IF PeRFORMANCe SPACe ONLY SeND INFORMATION FORM A
IF ARTS MUSeUM ONLY SeND INFORMATION FORM B
IF BOTH SeND INFORMATION FORM C
**A2. Is your facility a single building, a set of physically connected buildings, a cluster of separate buildings on a   
 single campus, or multiple buildings on separate sites?
  1 Single building
  2 Set of physically connected buildings
  3 Cluster of separate buildings on a single campus
  4 Multiple buildings on separate sites
  5 Other, specify ____________________________________________________
**A3. what part of your building(s) did the construction project concern?
INTeRVIeWeR: Try to determine what the CASe is here and ask the respondent to fill out the information forms with 
respect to that case.  Usually,
	 •	 If	there	is	a	single	building,	that	is	the	case.
	 •		If	there	are	multiple	buildings	on	multiple	sites,	it	should	be	the	building	associated	with	the	new	construction
	 •	 In	general	we	want	the	smallest	entity	that	both	keeps	its	own	set	of	books	and	encompasses	all	the	space		 	
  that was added, built or renovated as part of the large construction project.
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q1. Did the building project replace or renovate an existing facility or is it a completely new facility?
  1 Renovation/expansion of facility
  2 Replaced facility
	  3 Completely new facility 
  
q1.3 Is this also a new organization? 
  1 Yes  
  2 No  
q2. what is the ownership structure of your building or buildings? Are these owned by a government entity, by 
one of the arts groups that uses it or what? [cODE ALL THAT APPLY]
  1 Independently of the arts groups who use the facility
  2 Owned by one of the arts groups that uses the facility  
  3 Owned by an organization that also owns multiple arts groups  
   who use the facility
  4 University or College-owned
  5 Government owned
  6 Other, specify 
q3. can you tell me about the other performing arts centers, theaters or museums in your metropolitan area with 
whom you compete?
 ➔ Probe for HOW they compete
	 	 •	 for	audiences
	 	 •	 for	donations/funding
	 	 •	 for	programming	&	performers
	 	 •	 other?
q1.2 Is the function of the new space similar to the
previous facility?
  1 Yes
  2 No ➔ Can you describe how it is different?
q2.1 which one?
q2.2 what level?
01 City
02 County
03 State
04 Other, please specify 
____________________
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q4. Now can you tell me about performing arts centers, theaters or museums in the metropolitan area that you 
cooperate or collaborate with?
 ➔ Probe for HOW they cooperate or collaborate
	 	 •	 Programming	cooperation	or	collaboration
	 	 •	 Advertising	or	audience	development
	 	 •	 Donors	/	funding
	 	 •	 other?
ORgANIzATIONS wITH NO PERfORMANcE SPAcE SkIP TO q9 on page 4
Now I’d like to ask about performing groups and others who use your auditorium or theater space.
Let me first just quickly run through the list of groups that you listed on your information form to remind you of the 
different performers who used your space in this last season.
*q5.1 [READ THROUgH THE LIST Of cHEckED ITEMS– BOxES SHOULD BE PRE-cHEckED BY YOU PRIOR TO 
cALL fROM ADvANcE INfORMATION fORM]
q5.2.1 ➔ which of those groups would you say you’ve had more of since completing your building
project? INTERvIEwER – DO NOT PROMPT LINE BY LINE IN THE gRID – jUST USE IT TO MARk wHAT THE R SAYS 
IN RESPONSE TO YOUR OPEN qUESTION
q5.2.2 ➔ Are there any you’ve had fewer of? which are those? [DITTO INSTRUcTIONS ABOvE]
why have you had fewer?
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*q6. [fILL IN fROM INfORMATION fORM] I see from the information form that ____ groups are newly based at 
your center since the construction project. [If NONE SkIP TO q7]
q6.1 where were these housed before your project?
  
q6.2 what happened to their old space?
*q7. [fILL IN fROM INfORMATION fORM] I see from the information form that ____ touring groups from out of 
town performed at your center in the past season. [If NONE SkIP TO q8]
q7.1 Did all these same groups perform at your center prior to your building project?
  1 Yes
  2 No ➔	q7.2 Did any of them perform at other local venues before?
   1 Yes
   2 No
  
  ➔ q7.3 Did any of them simply not come to your area because there was not
  a performance space for them?
   1 Yes
   2 No 
q8. Are there any groups who used your space before the construction project but no longer do?
  1 Yes ➔	q8.1 why don’t they perform at your center anymore?
  2 No
ALL TYPES Of INSTITUTIONS
Now, let’s talk if we might about the decision to build/renovate/expand your facility.
q9. Think about the decision to carry out this building project.
 q9.1 who first proposed the idea? TITLE – TYPE Of PERSON ___________________
 q9.2 when did staff first start to spend time exploring the possibility of new or renovated space?
 Approx Date: _________________
 q9.3  when did the board first spend money for consultants or others to plan the project?
 Approx Date: ____________
 q9.4  when did the board approve a specific construction plan with a budget?
 Approx Date: ____________
q10. who had the primary responsibility for planning and managing the project?
 q10.1 At the beginning  [TITLe & POSITION IN ORGANIZATION] _____________________
 q10.2 At close  [TITLe & POSITION IN ORGANIZATION] _______________
 
 q10.3 If it was a committee, who was on the committee? _____________________
 q10.4 who chaired the committee? _____________________
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q11. what were the key reasons for undertaking the project? 
q12. what was the original vision for the project?  How did that change over time?
[PROMPT fOR BOTH ARcHITEcTURAL AND MISSION cHANgES]
q13. How long did the planning process last? A. _______months  OR
B._____________years
q14. How long did the fundraising process last? _____________________ years
q15. were public meetings held?
  1 Yes
  2 No
q16. were there other ways you sought community input?
  1 Yes
  2 No
q17. were any changes made as a result of community input?
  1 Yes
  2 No
q16.1 How?
q17.1 what were those?
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q18.1 who were the major opponents? 
 (Types of people / positions)
q18.2 what were their objections?
q18. was there any internal or external opposition to the project?
 
  1 Yes
 
  2 No
 
D19. were changes made to meet these objections?
  1 Yes
  2 No
 
q20. were outside experts and consultants used to guide the planning process?
  1 Yes
 
  2 No
q21. was there any market research done to test out the idea of the proposed building project?
  1 Yes
  2 No
q22. were field trips to other similar facilities taken by decision makers?
  1 Yes
  2 No
q19.1 what were they? 
q20.1 At what stage? 
q20.2 To whom did they report? [PROBE – did they 
report to the full board, just the executive committee, 
just the chair, to management or somebody else?]
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q23. was there a model project in another city on which this project is loosely or closely based?
  1 Yes-closely
  2 No-loosely 
q24. How many different architectural designs were considered, and over what period of time?
 A. Distinct designs _____________________
 B. Time period for consideration of different designs _____________ to __________________
q25. How was the final design chosen? (By whom, and following what kinds of procedures?) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
q26 Did any of the project planners consider the effects on the broader arts/cultural community in this area?
  1 Yes
  2 No
Now I would like to ask you about the governance structure of your organization.
*q27. You reported from the information form that your [governing board] has [  ] members.
q27.1 How are these members selected?  [GeT PROCeSS THROUGH WHICH SeLeCTeD AND MAIN 
CONSIDeRATIONS IN WHO THeY CHOOSe TO Be ON THe BOARD]
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
*If BOARD TERMS ARE NOT RENEwABLE [SEE INfORMATION fORM] SkIP TO q29
q28. You reported on the information form that terms for board members are renewable.
Are there any board members who remain on the board more or less indefinitely?
  1 Yes
  2 No 
   
q28.2 can you tell me about the “perpetual” members and what they bring to the board?
_______________________________________________________________________
q23.1  what was it?
A. Name 
B. Place
q26.1 How did they go about estimating the cultural 
and financial impact on the broader arts scene?
q28.1 How many do this? 
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q29. Some boards are made up of people who are experts in the areas relevant to the organization; some are 
made of people who are able to raise money for the organization. 
 Are members of your board chosen:
  1  More for their expertise (legal, marketing, risk management…)?
  2  More for their money raising ability to do effective fundraising?
q30. Are board members expected to make a specific annual contribution?
  1 Yes q30.1 How much is that? $_________________________
  2 No
 
q31. Did the board as a whole pledge to contribute a certain amount for the building project?
  1 Yes q31.1 How much was that? $_________________________
  2 No 
 
q32. was the board chair at the beginning of the project the same as the chair now?
  1 Yes 
  2 No q32.1 can you give us a timeline of the chairs from the beginning of the project until now? [with   
   respect to the project timeline in particular]
    ____________________________________________________________
*INTERvIwER fILL IN g7 fROM INfORMATION fORM If OBvIOUS - ELSE ASk.
q33. Is there an executive committee?
  1 Yes 
  2 No
q34. was there a special committee of the board to supervise the building project?
  1 Yes  q34.1 Did it remain in place for the duration of the project?
  2 No   1 Yes q34.2 who was on the committee
      2 No A. ______________________________
      B. ______________________________
      C. ______________________________
      D. ______________________________
      e. ______________________________
      F. ______________________________
      G. ______________________________
      H. ______________________________
      I. ______________________________
      J. ______________________________
q35. were there particular members of the board who actively participated in the management of the project?
  1 Yes  q35.1 which ones? gET NAMES OR DEScRIPTORS
  2 No 
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q36. were there changes in board membership during the time of the construction?
  1 Yes  q36.1 were any of these related to disagreements about how the project was going?
      1 Yes
      2 No
  2 No
q37. what was the overall turnover like on the board over the duration of the project planning and construction?
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
Now I have some questions about the project financing.
q38. After the board first approved the project, were there changes in the cost estimates?
  1 Yes  q38.1 By how much? ________________
     q38.2 why did the cost estimates change? [cHEck ALL THAT APPLY]
      1 Changes in specifications / changes in design
      2 Changes in material costs
      3 Changes in labor costs
      4 Other , specify
 
  2 No
q39. can you talk about when the budgets were increased to accommodate new costs and when the project was 
scaled back to meet the budget? [PROBE fOR wHETHER ScOPE wAS EvER INcREASED BEcAUSE “THEY wERE 
DOINg SOMETHINg ANYwAY”]
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
q40. Did the original cost estimates include projections for …
          Yes No Not Apply
A. lost revenues due to closure or reduced use during construction?  1  2 -4
B. moving or storage costs?      1  2 -4
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q41. How did actual lost revenues and moving or storage costs line up with your expectations?
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
q42. Did the planned opening date for the new facility change?
  1 Yes   q42.1 from what date to what date? ________________  to _____________________
  2 No
q43. Did the financing shift after the project was complete, i.e., shift from a construction loan to a mortgage?
  1 Yes 
  2 No
q44. Does the organization currently carry a debt related to the construction of the facility?
  1 Yes  q44.1 when will this debt be paid off?
     Date _____________________________
 
  2 No
q45. what projections were made about post-opening operating costs and revenues?
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
q46. when in the process were projections made about post-construction operating costs?
__________________________________________________________
q47. Did the projections for post-construction operating costs change over time?
  1 Yes 
  2 No 
q48. How do the /current operating costs and revenues compare with initial and subsequent estimates?
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
q49. were increased operating costs due to new construction factored into the fund-raising efforts for the project?
  1 Yes  q49.1 when did this happen? ____________________________________
     q49.2 How did these operating costs get factored into fundraising?
  2 No
f IgURE  I I . 8 . 
Interview Questionnaire (continued)
cultural Policy center at the University of chicago SeT IN STONe   58
q50. Has the organization ever run an operating deficit since opening the new facility, or has it balanced 
its books each year?
  1 Has run an operating deficit  q50.1 How many years since opening the new facility  
        have you run a deficit? _________________________
  2 Has balanced its books each year  q50.2 How have you covered  
        [these deficits / this deficit]?
   
q51. INTERvIEwER LOOk AT RESPONSE TO D3 – Earlier you mentioned key reasons for undertaking this 
project [REPEAT THESE BAck TO R]. In what ways has the project lived up to and not lived up to your 
original expectations?
	 •	 Probe specifically for whether the organization has tried to measure this in any way, for example  
  with attendance goals, numbers of performances, types of performances, etc.
q52. Are the costs and benefits associated with the new space helping or hurting your ability to survive in the cur-
rent economic period? How so?
  1 Helping  
   
  2 Hurting    
q53. what are your plans going forward to insure long-term operations?
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
q54. Are there any other lessons learned that you could share with us so that we can better understand the 
challenges in doing projects like this?
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
I have one final request. where could we get a list of the members of your board at the time the project was ap-
proved? This will help us code for how the expertise of the board changed or remained constant throughout the 
project and into the subsequent years following the completion of the project.
	 •	 If	R	can	provide	this	list,	arrange	for	how	we	are	going	to	get	it	(FAX,	email).
	 •	 IF	R	can	supply	the	list	now	over	the	phone	or	transfer	you	to	somebody	who	can,	do	so.
	 •	 If	R	can	supply	the	name	of	the	person	we	can	call	to	find	this	information,	get	the	contact	information	 
  for that person now.
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
THANk YOU!!!! we could not carry out this kind of research without your generous cooperation. we are grateful 
for your help. we will share a summary report from this project with you that we expect will be ready in the fall, 
perhaps by the end of September.
q52.1 How?  
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March, 2010
Dear______,
We are writing to invite you to participate in a major study of America’s cultural infrastructure. Sponsored by the  
Mellon, MacArthur and Kresge foundations, a research team led by investigators at the National Opinion Research 
Center at the University of Chicago (NORC) is examining the recent building boom that altered the country’s 
cultural landscape. This study will focus on both new cultural facilities and renovations that were begun between  
2002 and 2006. 
We are currently talking with 40-50 leaders of cultural groups in 13 cities in which major construction projects 
were located to get a better sense of how that project may have affected other arts groups and the overall local 
arts environment. 
We would like to talk to you for about 30 minutes on the phone in a mostly discursive way to learn more about how 
a specific cultural building project in your area may have had an impact on your organization. Because of the 
more open-ended nature of some of our questions, we will ask to tape the interview for accuracy and completeness. 
However, the information you provide us with will be kept confidential and not associated with your name or the 
name of your arts organization. The results of this study will help others who are planning similar projects. While your 
participation in this survey is voluntary, we along with our funders hope that you will assist us as we embark on this 
landmark study.
The Survey Lab at the University of chicago will be contacting you soon to schedule an interview. The enclosed 
project information sheet provides more detail. Should you have any questions, please contact joanna woronkowicz 
at (773) 256-6028 or woronkowicz-joanna@norc.uchicago.edu. If there is a more appropriate person at your 
organization for us to speak with, please let us know.
This study is the first such examination done on the broader cultural infrastructure in the United States, and it promises 
to be a very valuable resource for years to come. The insights you provide us with about your experiences and involve-
ment through participation in the survey will be crucial to its success. We thank you in advance for your assistance.
Sincerely yours,
D. Carroll Joynes
Senior Fellow
APPENDIx  I I I ; 
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Project Information Sheet
cultural Infrastructure in the United States
what is this study about? The cultural sector in the United States, primarily performing arts centers, theaters and 
museums, has experienced a recent building boom. Some of these buildings are expansions and renovations, and some 
are entirely new facilities. Some of these projects may increase audience, increase earned and donated income, and 
help realize an institution's mission. Conversely, large building projects may saddle arts organizations with debt that 
cuts into their ability to deliver core programming. The National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago 
has launched a research initiative to explore recent building projects and their consequences in a systematic way.  
The object of the research is to draw on the real experiences of a wide variety of arts groups in order to 
develop guidelines about how arts organizations might best approach facilities renovation and building projects 
to meet their needs. An important piece of this project involves speaking with leaders of cultural and arts groups in 
the communities where large projects were completed over the past 5-7 years. 
who is conducting this research? D. Carroll Joynes and Norman M. Bradburn, Senior Fellows at the National Opinion 
Research Center at the University of Chicago are directing the study. Peter Frumkin, Director of the RGK Center  
for Philanthropy and Community Service, Professor Robert H. Gertner of the Booth School of Business at the  
University of Chicago, and Professor Bruce Seaman of the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State 
University are the principal investigators who will be analyzing the data. The University of Chicago Survey Lab is 
carrying out the phone interviews. The study is being funded by the Mellon Foundation, Kresge Foundation, and the 
MacArthur Foundation. 
why should you participate? Although your participation is completely voluntary, it is critical to the success of this 
project. Large building projects may have unanticipated benefits or costs to other groups in the local arts and culture 
community. We need to hear directly from you about the effects on your group, if any, of a recent large project in  
your area. Only by hearing from leaders of many different types and sizes of groups can we form a clear picture of the 
community impact. we will share the report from this project with you.
what can you expect from completing a phone survey? We will ask you to speak to us in a semi-structured way 
by phone for 30 minutes. We will ask to record the interview to more quickly and accurately capture your thoughts. 
However, anything you tell us remains confidential and will not be linked with your name or the name of your 
organization. Questions will focus on ways a large building or renovation project completed several years ago by 
another arts group in your community may have affected the broader cultural scene and/or your group in particular. 
All recordings will be erased at the end of the project.
who will know what you say? The interviewer you speak with will know what you say. However, all our interviewers 
are trained to maintain the confidentiality of our survey respondents. we will not identify any participants or 
organizations by name. We will report summary results only. We may group responses by region of the country or 
broad size categories to make the results more meaningful. 
who can you contact if you have questions or concerns? Your rights as a participant in survey research are protected 
by the University of Chicago’s and NORC’s institutional review boards (IRB). If you have questions about your rights 
as a study participant or if you ever think your rights have been violated you are encouraged to contact the NORC 
IRB Administrator, toll free, at 866-309-0542 or the Social and Behavioral Sciences IRB at 773-834-7835, Judd 333,  
5835 S. Kimbark Ave. Chicago IL 60637. If you have questions about the research itself or want to schedule an  
interview time, please call Survey Lab Director Martha Van Haitsma at 773-834-3674 or call us on our toll-free number 
at 1-866-523-3674.
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Hello, I’m calling from the University of Chicago. You should recently have gotten a letter in the mail from us explaining 
a research project we’re working on about renovations and expansions of space at cultural institutions and how this 
affects the larger environment for cultural groups in a city. 
[IF R NeVeR GOT THe LeTTeR, CONFIRM MAILING ADDReSS AND SeND ANOTHeR. APOLOGIZe AND LeT R 
KNOW THeY SHOULD GeT IT SOON] 
You are located in one of 13 cities selected because there was at least one large renovation, new building or expansion 
project there over the past five to seven years and we’d like to talk to all the leaders of cultural groups in these cities to 
form a picture of the impact such projects have on the broader arts community.  
We are doing the interviews by phone, these take about half an hour to complete and because it is difficult to entirely 
standardize questions for such a diverse group we are taping response to make sure we get accurate and full  
information. However, we do keep whatever you and others tell us confidential and do not link it with your name or the 
name of your organization. Your participation is entirely voluntary, but we depend on your generous cooperation to 
get a full and accurate picture of how large building projects affect the cultural and arts community.
We can schedule interviews at your convenience – weekday days, evenings or weekends.  The interview takes about  
30 minutes.  We believe the results of this study will be very valuable to the cultural and arts community.
Can we schedule a time to speak with you?
 Hard refusa ➔ THANK AND SeND “Please reconsider” LeTTeR
 Agree ➔ THANK AND SCHeDULe
 Too busy now, call back another time ➔ DOCUMeNT WHeN IT WOULD Be BeTTeR TO CALL BACK AND 
 CONFIRM WHO We SHOULD Be ASKING TO SPeAK WITH AT THAT TIMe. 
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Please Reconsider Letter
<DATe>
Dear ,
Recently we called you about a study of cultural organization building projects. You were not interested in participat-
ing. Nobody will call you again about this research project, but …
Please reconsider!
	 •	 We	appreciate	that	your	time	is	valuable.	we can schedule our interview in short segments by phone.  
  Total time is only about 30 minutes. 
	 •	 A	high	response	rate	is	needed	to	make	sure	that	the	experiences	and	opinions	of	all organizational types   
  and all parts of the country are properly represented. 
  
	 •	 Because	your	organization	was	selected	through	a	scientific	sampling	process,	we cannot substitute  
  anybody for you.
  
			 •	 You	can	choose	to	skip	any	question	you	don’t	wish	to	answer	and	end	the	interview	at	any	time.
  
	 •	 Your	answers	are	confidential	and	not	linked	to	your	identity.
  
	 •	 You	can	schedule	an	interview	at	a time that is convenient for you, daytime or evening, weekday or weekend. 
We depend on the generous cooperation of arts organization leaders such as you to make sure that policy makers and 
arts funders have the data they need to make informed decisions.
Please call [DAVID OR KeVIN AT ##] to set up a time for an interview. We appreciate your serious consideration of this 
request. You may also call me on my direct line provided below my signature. Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Martha Van Haitsma, Director
University of Chicago Survey Lab
(773) 834-3674
mvh@uchicago.edu
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Interview Questionnaire
Community Survey
Introduction: 
	 •	 We	are	conducting	a	survey	at	the	University	of	Chicago	to	see	how	renovations,	expansions	and	new	 
  construction of space at cultural institutions affect the larger environment for cultural groups in a city. 
 
	 •	 We	want	to	know	how	the	[NEW	CONSTRUCTION/EXPANSION/RENOVATION]	of	[NAME	OF	 
  ORGANIZATION] that was started in [DATe1] and opened in [DATe2] affected you and other cultural  
  organizations in the [CITY] area. 
 
	 •	 We	are	also	conducting	interviews	with	groups	in	12	other	cities	around	the	country.		The	survey	should	take		 	
  about 30 minutes. 
 
	 •	 We	want	to	remind	you	that	your	participation	is	completely	voluntary,	that	you	may	decline	to	answer	any		 	
  question and that you may end the interview at any time. 
 
	 •	 For	completeness,	accuracy	and	to	speed	things	along	I	am	asking	to	record	this	interview.	We	will	keep		 	
  what you tell us confidential and not associate it with your name or the name of your organization. The  
  recordings will not be transcribed and we erase them at the end of the project. Is it OK to record this  
  interview? 
 [YeS- OKAY TO ReCORD] Thank you. Remember that you can ask us to stop recording at any time. 
 [NO] Is it okay to continue with the interview without recording? 
 [YeS] [PROCeeD WITH CLOSeD-CODeD QUeSTIONS AND FIeLD CODe OTHeRS WHeRe POSSIBLe] 
 [NO] [THANK THe ReSPONDeNT AND eND THe CALL]
First I’d like to make sure I have the right information about you and your organization.
 1. what is the proper full name of your organization? __________________________________
 2. what is your role in the organization? _____________________________________________
 3. How long has your organization been in existence?
  _____ years or since YEAR  ________
 4. what year did you join the organization? _______________
Now, let’s talk about the time when [PROJeCT] was in the planning and building phase. 
5. During the planning process for this project would you say that [ORgANIzATION] was …
 Very Open/Somewhat Open/Not Very Open/Not Open At All/Don’t know
6. was your organization ever contacted directly about the project by [ORgANIzATION] or someone speaking  
on their behalf?
 Yes/No 
7. was your organization ever given a chance to voice your views about [ORgANIzATION]’s building 
project?
   Yes/No
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8. Overall did [ORgANIzATION] solicit input from other cultural organizations like yours about the decision to 
[BUILD/ExPAND/RENOvATE] their facility a great deal, some, not very much or none at all?
 
 A great deal/Some/Not very much/None at all/Don’t Know
 AT THIS POINT, IF R SAID DK TO Q5 AND NOW eXPLAINS THAT THeY HAVe NO IDeA ABOUT ANYTHING   
 HAVING TO DO WITH THe PLANNING OR BUILDING PHASe, PROVIDe AN OPPORTUNITY TO SKIP TO   
 Q17. THIS IS ONLY AN OPTION FOR THOSe WHO TeLL US THeY HAVe NO KNOWLeDGe OR OPINION   
 ABOUT THe PLANNING/BUILDING PHASe.
9.In your opinion, were there any potential stakeholders that did not have a chance to provide input? 
 Yes/No 
     9b. If Yes: what stakeholders were left out? [IF R GIVeS NAMeS OF SPeCIFIC GROUPS MAKe SURe   
    TO ASK WHAT TYPe OF PeOPLe OR GROUPS THOSe ARe ]
10. Overall, would you say [ORgANIzATION] was very responsive, fairly responsive, somewhat responsive or not at 
all responsive to the objections, needs and desires of the stakeholders who were given a chance to provide input 
about the project?
 Very responsive/Fairly Responsive/Somewhat Responsive/Not At All Responsive
11. At any point did [ORgANIzATION] search for other cultural organizations as potential partners to help build 
and share the new space?
 Yes/No/Don’t Know If NO or Dk, SkIP TO q14
12. was your organization solicited as a potential partner to [ORgANIzATION]’s building project? 
 Yes/No 
 If YES 12a. was your organization solicited … before plans were in place or after plans were in place?
      Before plans were in place/After plans were in place 
  12b. Did you become a partner?
     Yes /No
    IF YeS:  12.b.1 In your opinion, would you say your organization’s needs were  
       considered during the project planning phase…
          A Great Deal/A Fair Amount/Very Little/Not At All?
13. Did [ORgANIzATION] partner with other cultural organizations in building the project? 
 Yes/No/Don’t know
    IF YeS:  13a. In your opinion, would you say the needs of other partners of the project were  
     considered during the project planning phase…
      A Great Deal/A Fair Amount/Very Little/Not At All?
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 14. How familiar are you with the planning and building phase of the [PROjEcT]? would you say you are …
 Very familiar / Somewhat familiar / A little familiar / or Know nothing at all about it?
  IF KNOW NOTHING AT ALL ABOUT IT SKIP TO Q17
15.Did your organization object to any of the decisions made by [ORgANIzATION] in their planning and  
building phase? 
 Yes/No
  IF YeS: 
  15a what were the objections raised by your organization? 
  15b. How were these objections raised
  15c. were the objections addressed by [ORgANIzATION]? 
     Yes/No
   15.c.1 IF YeS: How were the objections addressed by [ORgANIzATION]? 
16. were changes made in [ORgANIzATION]’s plans for the project as a result of input from yours or other cultural 
organizations in the [cITY] area?
 Yes/No
   IF YeS: 16a. what were these changes? 
Now let’s talk about the need for this project. 
17.were any other cultural organizations in the [cITY] area planning to build or in the process of building large 
projects at the same time as [ORgANIzATION]?  
 Yes/No
   a. If YES: which organizations? [LIST NAMeS OF ORGANIZATIONS. IF YOU CAN’T GeT NAMeS,  
   LIST TYPeS OF ORGANIZATIONS]
18. Do you think there was an evident need in the community for the kind of space [PROjEcT] provides?
 Yes/No?
   If YES: 18a. Do you think the new space met this need completely, mostly, or partially? 
19. Okay, now we’d like you to think about public sentiment before the project was built compared with after  
it was completed.
19a.1 Before the project was completed do you think the community felt there was a clear need for [PROjEcT]? 
 Yes / No
19a.2 After the project was completed do you think the community felt there was in fact a need for [PROjEcT]?
 Yes, but less so/ Yes / Yes and even more so*
 No, but less so / No / No and even more so*
*If ANSwER IS DIffERENT fROM BEfORE TO AfTER, IN AfTER cHOOSE fROM jUST YES OR NO. 
*If THE ANSwER IS THE SAME fROM BEfORE TO AfTER, ADDITIONAL fIELD cODE OPTIONS fOR vOLUN-
TEERED ANSwERS, BUT DO NOT PROBE fOR THESE:
 If BOTH YES ➔ OPTIONS fOR ANSwERS TO 2nd PART ARE Yes, but less so; Yes; Yes and even more so.
 If BOTH NO ➔ OPTIONS fOR ANSwERS TO 2nd PART No, but less so; No; No, and even more so
If THIS IS NEw cONSTRUcTION OR REPURPOSINg (NO OLD BUILDINg) SkIP TO 19f.1
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19b.1 Before the project was completed, do you think the community felt the old building did not help accommo-
date all those who wanted to attend museum exhibits and programs(fOR MUSEUMS)/performances and programs 
(fOR THEATRES AND PAcs)? Yes/No
19b.2 what about after it was completed?  
 Yes, but less so/ Yes / Yes and even more
 No, but less so / No / No and even more so
19c.1 Before the project was completed, do you think the community felt the old building did not help accommo-
date the types of museum exhibits and programs (fOR MUSEUMS)/performances and programs (fOR THEATRES 
AND PAcs) the community needed? Yes/No
19c.2 what about after it was completed?  
 Yes, but less so/ Yes / Yes and even more
 No, but less so / No / No and even more so
IF BY THIS QUeSTION R HAS RePeATeD THeY HAVe NO IDeA ABOUT PUBLIC SeNTIMeNT ABOUT ANYTHING 
HAVING TO DO WITH THe PROJeCT, HeRe YOU CAN SKIP TO Q19H.1
19d.1 Before the project was completed, do you think the community believed the old building did not help accom-
modate the level of museum exhibit and program (fOR MUSEUMS)/performance and program (fOR THEATRES 
AND PAcS) quality the community needed? 
 Yes/No
19d.2 what about after it was completed?  
 Yes, but less so/ Yes / Yes and even more
 No, but less so / No / No and even more so
19e.1 Before the project was completed, do you think the community felt the old building did not help  
accommodate the community’s need for arts education? 
 Yes/No
19e.2 what about after it was completed?  
 Yes, but less so/ Yes / Yes and even more
 No, but less so / No / No and even more so
19f.1 Before the project was completed, do you think people in your community thought that the [PROjEcT] would 
improve things for only a small number of people? 
 Yes/No
19f.2 what about after it was completed?  
 Yes, but less so/ Yes / Yes and even more
 No, but less so / No / No and even more so
19g.1 Before the project was completed do you think people in your community thought the new building would 
help spur economic development in the neighborhood?
 Yes/No
19g.2 what about after it was completed?  
 Yes, but less so/ Yes / Yes and even more
 No, but less so / No / No and even more so
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19h.1 Before the project was completed, do you think the community felt the new building would help your  
community be a more attractive place to live and do business
 Yes/No
19h.2 what about after it was completed?  
 Yes, but less so/ Yes / Yes and even more
 No, but less so / No / No and even more so
ASk ONLY If NEw cONSTRUcTION AND HAD AN OLD BUILDINg
q9i.1 Before the project was completed, do you think the community believed the new building would allow the 
community to reuse [ORgANIzATION]’s old building for a different purpose?
 Yes/no
19i.2 what about after it was completed?  
 Yes, but less so/ Yes / Yes and even more
 No, but less so / No / No and even more so
Now thinking of your own opinion before and after the project was built, here are two more statements:
19k.1 Before the project was completed did you believe the project would have little impact on your organization? 
 Yes/No
19k.2 what about after it was completed?  
 Yes, but less so/ Yes / Yes and even more
 No, but less so / No / No and even more so
19l.1 Before the project was completed did you believe the project would have little impact on the community? 
 Yes/No
19l.2 what about after it was completed?  
 Yes, but less so/ Yes / Yes and even more
 No, but less so / No / No and even more so
Now I would like to ask you a few questions about the impact of the project on other cultural organizations in the 
[cITY] area.
20. Do you think this project has affected your organization's exhibits and programs (fOR MUSEUMS)/performanc-
es and programs (fOR THEATRES AND PERfORMINg ARTS cENTERS)? 
 
 Yes/No IF YeS ➔ 20A.How? [LISTeN TO ANSWeR, CODe ALL THAT APPLY BeLOW AND WRITe  
 DOWN ANY NeW ReSPONSeS NOT COVeReD HeRe]
 (FOR MUSeUMS)
 More competition for traveling exhibits
 More large-scale/blockbuster exhibits
 More small-scale exhibits
 Less exhibits and programs altogether
 More exhibits and programs altogether
 Have to change exhibits and programs more often
	 Less	flexibility	with	exhibits	and	programs
 More competition with exhibits and programs
 Overlap in exhibits and programs
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 (FOR THeATeRS AND PACS)
 More competition for local artists/performers
 More competition for touring artists/performers
 More large-scale/blockbuster programming
 More small-scale programming
 Less programming altogether
 More programming altogether
 Have to change programming more often
	 Less	flexibility	with	programming
 More competition with programming
 Overlap in programming
21. At any stage, do you think that this project affected your fundraising?
 Yes/No  IF YeS ➔	21A.How? [LISTeN TO ANSWeR, CODe ALL THAT APPLY BeLOW AND WRITe DOWN   
 ANY NeW ReSPONSeS NOT COVeReD HeRe]
 Had to find new donors
 Had to work longer/harder to raise the same funds
 Less total money came in
 Smaller average gift size
 New donors materialized
 easier to raise funds
 More total money came in
 Larger average gift size
22. As a result of this project, at any stage, did charitable gifts toward your organization…
Increase/Decrease/Stay the Same?
 IF INCReASe OR DeCReASe:
 22a. Approximately by what percent did the average size of gifts from your donors increase/decrease?    
 _____________%
 22b. Approximately by what percent did the total value of gifts from your donors increase/decrease?    
 _____________% 
 22c. At what point in the process did this happen?
  Pre-building Stage/Building Stage/Operational Stage
 22d. Is the project still impacting your fundraising? 
  Yes/No
  IF YeS: 22d.1 How? [LISTeN TO ANSWeR, CODe ALL THAT APPLY BeLOW AND WRITe DOWN ANY NeW   
  ReSPONSeS NOT COVeReD HeRe]
    Had to find new donors
    Had to work longer/harder to raise the same funds
    Less total money came in
    Smaller average gift size
    New donors materialized
    easier to raise funds
    More total money came in
    Larger average gift size
 IF NO: 22d.2 when did the project stop affecting your organization’s fundraising? [PROBe FOR 
 APPROXIMATe DATe. IF NOT ABLe TO GeT A DATe, PROBe FOR TIMe SINCe OPeNING OF PROJeCT]
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23. Do you think the [PROjEcT]‘s fundraising efforts increased the number of donors who give to artistic and cul-
tural organizations in your community? 
 Yes/No
If YES: 23a.would you characterize these donors as …
 New donors who have never given to any type of organizations before
 Donors who have given to other types of organizations but had never given to  
 cultural and artistic organizations before
 Or a combination of the two?
24. Do you think the [PROjEcT]’s fundraising efforts increased the community's appreciation for the value of and 
need for philanthropy? 
 Yes/No
25. In your opinion, was the overall impact of [PROjEcT] on other cultural organizations in the [cITY] area posi-
tive, negative, or did it not have an impact?
 Positive/Negative/No Impact
26. Do you think the impact of the project made cultural organizations in the [cITY] area feel more competitive/
more collaborative/there was no impact either way.
27. Did your attendance increase, decrease or stay the same in the year following the opening of [PROjEcT]?
 Increase/Decrease/Stay the Same
 If INcREASED/DEcREASED: 27a. How long after the [PROjEcT] opened did this 
 increase/decrease last? 
 _______years/it is still going on
 27b. Do you think the change was due to [PROjEcT]?  Yes/No
28. Since the [PROjEcT]’s planning phase have you had any difficulty in filling openings in your organization with 
the right caliber of talent? 
 Yes/No.
 If YES:  28a. what positions have you had difficulty staffing? [PROBe FOR CODeS]
      28b. Do you think the change was due to [PROjEcT]? 
29. Since the project’s planning phase, has the difficulty of finding new board members for your organization in-
creased, decreased, or stayed the same? 
 Increased/Decreased/Stayed the Same
If INcREASED/DEcREASED: 29a. Do you think the change was due to [PROjEcT]?  Yes/No
30. Do you think the number of tourists in your city has increased since [PROjEcT]’s opening? 
 Yes/No/Don’t Know
31. Do you think [PROjEcT]’s makes [cITY] a more attractive place to live? 
 Yes/No
32. Have any new businesses opened in or relocated to the [PROjEcT]’s area since the project’s opening?
 Yes/No/Don’t Know
 
 If YES: 32a. Do you think it was due to [PROjEcT]?  Yes/No
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33. Do you think the [PROjEcT] has raised the awareness of the cultural organizations in your community? 
 Yes/No
34. Have you seen any [other] changes in the economic conditions of the [cITY] area that you would attribute to 
the building of this project? [PROBE fOR cODES]
Now I would like to turn to your views about the impact of the opening of the project on [ORgANIzATION] itself.
35. On a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being “greatly diminished” and 5 being “greatly enhanced,” would you please rate 
the following activities of [ORgANIzATION] since the project’s opening: 
(fOR MUSEUMS)
a. Number of exhibits and programs
b. Attendance 
c. Quality of exhibits and programs
d. Diversity of exhibits and programs
e. Quality of educational exhibits and programs
f. Quality of community outreach efforts
g. Quality of exhibits/artists exhibited
h. Ability of audiences to get to the building
(fOR THEATRES AND PAcS)
a. Number of performances and programs
b. Attendance
c. Artistic quality of performances and programs
d. Diversity of performances and programs
e. Quality of educational performances and programs
f. Quality of community outreach efforts
g. Quality of actors/directors involved in productions
h. Quality of actors and directors involved in productions
i. Ability to present works by local performers and artists
j. Ability of audiences to get to the building
ASk ONLY If fOcAL PROjEcT IS A THEATER OR PERfORMINg ARTS cENTER
36. On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being “very poor” and 10 being “excellent,” how would you rank the quality of 
[PROjEcT]’s acoustics? OR DK- Never been there during a performance
ASk ONLY If fOcAL PROjEcT IS A MUSEUM
37. On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being “very poor” and 10 being “excellent,” how would you rank the quality of 
the [PROjEcT]’s exhibition spaces? ? OR Dk- Never been there 
38. Overall, how would you rate the impact the [PROjEcT] had on [ORgANIzATION]?  
Positive/Negative/No impact at all
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finally, I’d like to ask you a few final questions about your organization.
39. How would you classify your organization?
 Visual Arts/Theatre/Performing Arts Center/Dance/Music/Opera/Other(Please Specify)
40. what was your organization’s approximate annual attendance for the last programming year? 
41. How many permanent full-time employed staff does your organization have? 
42. Do you consider your organization to be a competitor with [fOcAL ORgANIzATION]?
 Yes/No
43. Do you consider your organization to be located in the same district as [fOcAL ORgANIzATION]?
 Yes/No
Is there anything we haven’t covered that you would like to add about ways the building project we have been 
discussing affected either your group or the larger environment for cultural groups in your area?
Thank you for your assistance!  Do you still have the Project Information Sheet we mailed to you?
If YES – Hang onto that sheet – it has contact information in case you have questions later. It also has 
  contact information for the Institutional Review Board in case you have complaints or believe your rights   
  as a research participant have been violated. We really appreciate your help. We could not carry out a   
  social science research project of this nature without the generous assistance of community leaders such   
  as you.
If NO –  Would you like me to provide contact information for you in case you have questions later?
If you have questions about the substance of the research, please contact Joanna Woronkowicz at (773) 256-6028 or 
Martha Van Haitsma at (773) 834-3674.
If you have complaints about our conduct of this research or feel your rights as a research participant have not been 
protected, please contact our institutional review board at 773-834-7835 and refer to project H10090.
We really appreciate your help. We could not carry out social science research project of this nature without the 
generous assistance of community leaders such as you.
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